Social capital, human capital, and labour market outcomes by Carayol, Timothée
The London School of Economics and Political Science
Social Capital, Human Capital,
and Labour Market Outcomes.
Timothée Carayol
A thesis submitted to the Department of Economics of the London School of
Economics for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy, London, September 2011
Declaration
I certify that the thesis I have presented for examination for the PhD degree in
Economics of the London School of Economics and Political Science is solely my own
work other than where I have clearly indicated that it is the work of others (in which
case the extent of any work carried out jointly by me and any other person is clearly
identified in it).
Chapter 3 of this thesis is the outcome of joint work with Pauline Givord.
The copyright of this thesis rests with the author. Quotation from it is permitted,
provided that full acknowledgement is made. This thesis may not be reproduced
without the prior written consent of the author.
I warrant that this authorization does not, to the best of my belief, infringe the
rights of any third party.
1
Abstract
This thesis aims to document several aspects pertaining to the dynamics of human
capital, both from a theoretical and an empirical viewpoint.
Chapter 2 studies how informational flows arising from social connections can
affect careers and promotions. It aims to achieve identification of this causal pathway
by focusing on the careers of bishops in the Catholic church. The range of the data,
both in time and in space, makes it possible to infer some types of social connections
between bishops (based on geography and careers), which in turn allows for the
identification of their effect on careers. I find that being connected to the relevant
bishops has a positive and significant effect on the likelihood of promotion to a
diocese.
Chapter 3 investigates the transmission of human capital from one generation
to the next. While the correlation of parents’ educational achievement with that of
their children is strong and well documented, there is a scarcity of consensual evidence
that this relationship has a causal nature. We use a French reform that increased the
duration of compulsory schooling by two years as a natural experiment, providing
exogenous variation in parental years of schooling, and study its effect on the children
of the affected individuals. We find evidence of a strong effect of paternal education
on the educational achievement of children.
Research on employer learning has concentrated on contexts where there is uncer-
tainty only on either the general or the match-specific human capital of the worker.
2
3Chapter 4 develops a model where general and specific human capital coexist, and
the uncertainty is on their respective shares in total productivity. The model gen-
erates predictions on a number of dimensions, e.g. declining worker mobility with
experience and increase in wage variance over the lifetime.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
The last sixty years have witnessed the emergence of the very powerful and ubiquitous
concept of human capital (see, for example, Becker, 1962) in economic research. The
closest to an exhaustive definition may be as follows: human capital is the set of
characteristics specific to a person and which may affect the ability of this person to
create value. This includes cognitive skills, such as literacy, mental calculus, general
knowledge, as well as non-cognitive skills such as patience, ambition, moral values;
it also includes health, both physical and mental.
Another concept, very related to that of human capital to the point of sometimes
overlapping, is that of social capital. Loosely defined, social capital describes the
value of all the social connections of an individual or group of individuals. This
includes, for example, friendships, professional relationships, and family.
This thesis explores the interplay between social capital and human capital, and
how these impact an individual’s labour market outcomes.
The next chapter, chapter 2, investigates the impact of social connections on
the likelihood of future promotions. As social capital in an organization is likely
to be correlated with human capital (if not in terms of number of connections, at
least in terms of intensity of connections to the most influential persons), isolating
8
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this causal effect requires a cautious identification strategy. Chapter 3 examines
intergenerational transmission of human capital, that is, how human capital (more
specifically, educational achievement) is passed on from parents to children. Again,
correlations are likely to be misleading, as many factors are bound to affect both
parental education and child education. Finally, chapter 4 examines how the human
capital of an employee, initially assumed to be difficult to observe, becomes progres-
sively known both to the employer and to the employee. The consequences of this
learning process in terms of worker turnover and wage dynamics are explored.
Anecdotal evidence abounds to indicate that social connections can play a crucial
role in an individual’s labour market outcomes. An individual connected to influential
decision makers within an organization will likely be treated differently from other
candidates to a given vacancy. Such occurrences are seen, in some cases, as beneficial
to an organization (hence the existence, in many firms, of sizeable incentives to refer
a social connection as a potential employee); in other cases, they are perceived as
harmful and are a source of criticism. A famous example of the latter is the tendency
that popes once had to offer positions of responsibility to their nephews (sometimes
as young as 14), with arguably little regard to whether such appointments were in
the interest of the Catholic Church. Identifying the causal effect of social connec-
tions on the likelihood of being offered a position, however, is not straightforward.
Firstly, social connections are difficult to observe or quantify; secondly, the sources
of exogenous variation in social connections that would aid identifications are rare.
Chapter 2 attempts to achieve this by focusing on the careers of bishops. Particular
institutional features, as well as the availability of exhaustive data, make it possible
to construct an identification strategy: distances between dioceses provide a way to
infer certain types of connections, while death and retirement of bishops provide a
source of arguably exogenous variations. It is found that a connected bishop is up
to 40% more likely to be promoted to a larger diocese than an otherwise identical
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unconnected bishop.
In France, cohorts born before 1953 faced compulsory schooling laws that re-
quired them to study until age 14. For later cohorts, schooling was made compulsory
until age 16 as a result of a reform announced in 1959 and known as the Berthoin
reform. Compliance to this reform was remarkable; the data shows a clear jump
in the proportion of a cohort who studied until age 16 or older. For compliers,
this reform is an exogenous source of variation in the number of years of schooling
achieved. We use this as a natural experiment in chapter 3, enabling us to study
the educational achievement of the children of the cohorts impacted by the reform.
This exercise allows us to identify, for these populations, the causal impact of an
individual’s education on the education of his or her children.
Some forms of human capital are general, in that they may affect the ability to
create value in a wide variety of circumstances. The ability to read, for example, is
useful in any employment relationship in developed countries, and required in most.
Other forms of human capital are much more specific: in-depth knowledge of atomic
structure and nuclear reactions, while an absolute prerequisite for a career as nuclear
physicist, would be useless for a professional tennis player. This distinction is almost
as old as the concept of human capital (see Becker, 1962), yet the question of how
these two quantities interact and that of their relative importance in employment
relationships has proved difficult to answer fully; in fact, much of the literature has
been forced to make strong simplifications, often assuming that all human capital
is general. This duality of human capital is explored, from a theoretical point of
view, in chapter 4 of this thesis. More specifically, the core assumption of the model
developped in this chapter is that, while the production of a worker is easy to observe,
it is uncertain how much of this production is due to match-specific factors, and how
much would in fact be transferable to other employment relationships. This chapter
contributes to the literature on employer learning, the core tenet of which is that
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employers learn only progressively about the productivity of each employee. This
literature typically assumes that all human capital is either match-specific (as in the
seminal paper, Jovanovic, 1979) or general (for example, Lange, 2007). While these
assumptions may make sense in some contexts, in reality, human capital is likely
to be partly specific (e.g. very specicific expertise) and partly transferable to other
matches (e.g. ability to read, interpersonal skills).
Chapter 2
Stairway to Heaven: Social
Connections and Promotions in
the Catholic Church
2.1 Introduction
The focus of much of empirical personnel economics is on profit-maximizing firms
in the private sector. An increasing number of studies document careers within a
firm, i.e. the dynamics of wages and promotions. See, for example, Lazear (1999),
Baker et al. (1994). These studies are mostly descriptive, but do not explain the
mechanisms through which, for example, a candidate for a promotion is chosen over
another. Belzil and Bognanno (2008) study the promotion dynamics of American
executives across hundreds of firms; the panel structure of their data allow them to
delve deeper into the dynamics of promotions and careers than earlier research was
able to. However, there is yet a lot to learn about the determinants of promotions.
In face of their importance, both for firms (as they define their hierachy), and for
workers (as they are key to their career and act as a key incentive), further work to
12
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understand promotions seems necessary.
Another literature concerns itself with the interplay between social connections
and labour market outcomes. The outcomes considered are usually employment
(Bramoullé and Saint-Paul (2004), Cingano and Rosolia (2006)..) or pay (Mont-
gomery (1991)). The effect of social connections on promotions has been overlooked
so far, probably due to a lack of readily available data on social connections. This
restricts the economic research on social connections to theoretical studies or very
specific empirical studies. Indeed, social connections are rarely observed or measured.
Even proxies are hard to come by (e.g. numbers of email exchanges in Marmaros and
Sacerdote (2006)). To my knowledge, no study so far has attempted to identify the
role of social connections on promotions. This paper aims to pioneer this research
avenue, using data on the careers of Catholic bishops.
The reasons that make the hierarchy of the Catholic Church lend itself ideally to
this exercise are multiple. (1) It is a uniquely large organization, with a homogenous
hierarchy over a large part of the world and over an extended period of time. (2) It is
a quintessential internal labour market. Individuals are enrolled in this market at a
young age, and normally only leave it upon death or retirement. It is therefore possi-
ble to observe entire careers with great accuracy. (3) Its local institutions (dioceses)
form a geographical web over each country where the Church is present. (4) The
local administrators (bishops) are required to meet regularly with their geographical
neighbours, owing to institutional features detailed in the next pages. Identifying
some connections based of geographical criteria is therefore possible. Because suc-
cessful identification relies on each of these four features, a similar exercise would be
much more perilous in most other organizations.
The (unobserved) actual social connections1 of bishops are likely to be endoge-
1Meaning the full knowledge of how well each bishop knows each of his peers, and how highly
he thinks of each of them.
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nous. Indeed, the unobservable skills that are valued in this labour market may be
correlated with social skills, which in turn enable the formation of strong social con-
nections with influential peers. This means that bishops with powerful friends are
likely to also be highly skilled and/or ambitious, both of which are unobserved and
may cause better career outcomes. However, focusing on the arguably exogenous,
purely geographical proxies for social connections that I use in this study addresses
this concern at least partially. I am able to back this approach with specification
tests involving placebo connections with recently dead bishops.
There are two ways in which one could interpret an effect of social connections
on promotions. One way is through signalling under imperfect information. The
ability of workers is hard to observe in most labour markets, especially in services.
Social connections make it possible to observe characteristics of the worker, some of
which may be correlated with productivity and performance. Therefore, a socially
connected worker may be more or less likely to be promoted than a less connected
colleague, depending on the assessment that his connections have made of his skills.
(A very able worker will benefit from social connections, whereas a less able worker
would perhaps be better off with a low profile.) If signalling about ability is the
only medium through which social connections affect careers, the aggregate effect of
social connections can be expected to be positive; this is especially the case if the
organization is risk averse, i.e. if a worker known to have an average productivity is
preferred to a worker whose productivity is entirely unknown.
The other way is through favouritism. Some social connections result in friend-
ships, and decision makers may prefer to promote a friend rather than someone they
have never heard of, even if their expected suitability for the job is similar. A com-
parable behaviour has been documented in Bandiera et al. (2009), where it is found
that managers will tend to favour their friends regardless of ability as long as they
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are paid a fixed wage2. This phenomenon has a long history in the catholic church,
where in past centuries it was usual for popes to incardinate their nephews (hence
the name “nepotism”).
Of course, these mechanisms are not mutually exclusive. This study does not at-
tempt to distinguish between them. It is a meaningful distinction to make, however,
and a tantalizing subject for further research. The first mechanism is a healthy fea-
ture of a meritocracy, as it helps the flow of information within the organization and
benefits the hierarchy. The second mechanism, on the contrary, introduces frictions
in the process of allocating skills to the jobs that use them best. However, in the
data used in this study, both mechanisms are undistinguishable3 and the observed
effect is a combination of both phenomena.
My findings show that connections do matter in this labour market. Candidates
to a vacant diocese are more likely to be appointed if they have a connection with one
or more of the bishops in the province of the vacancy. More precisely, connected bish-
ops with otherwise average characteristics are about 40% more likely to be appointed
than otherwise identical, non-connected bishops. I present evidence that this effect
is causal, in the form of placebo specifications where past connections with bishops
that are now retired or dead are shown to have no significant effect4 on the likelihood
of promotion.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. The next section, section 2.2,
proposes a simple microeconomic model that illustrates the possible role of connec-
tions in promotions. Section 2.3 describes the institution and the data. Section 2.4
describes the estimation strategy and the results. Section 2.5 concludes.
2Under performance pay, however, managers tend to favour high-ability workers regardless of
connections.
3We would require, at least, information on worker ability to make the distinction.
4With standard errors small enough to rule out an effect of the magnitude found for live bishops.
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2.2 Microeconomic model of connections and promotions
This section describes a simple theoretical model on the interplay between connec-
tions and promotions.
A vacancy must be filled, for which there are N + 1 candidates. For simplicity,
only one candidate is connected to the decision maker. Let i ∈ {1, .., N} index a
candidate with no connection. Let N + 1 denote the connected individual.
Regardless of connectedness, every individual has an (i.i.d.) ability parameter
ai = ui + γdi, where ui follows a uniform distribution between 0 and 1, and di
follows a Bernoulli distribution with parameter p. ui and di are independent. γ is a
parameter between 0 and 1. This (to my knowledge) unusual distribution of ability
is attractive for two reasons. First, depending on the values of the parameters, it can
be made to look like a uniform (low γ) or like a thin-tailed distribution (γ around
.5). Furthermore, the skewness of the distribution is related to p. A high p will cause
a thin lower tail, and a thick upper tail of the ability distribution. Second, these
distributions are general enough to carry interesting results, yet simple enough to
obtain very tractable formulae.
For the connected candidate, ai is fully observable; for all others, only the ui
component can be observed, and is only observed if the decision maker decides not to
pick his connection5. Furthermore, the decision maker receives a personal premium c
when he appoints the connected candidate; however, this premium does not translate
into actual production. The actual production if candidate i is appointed is simply
assumed to be given by ai. I assume further that the connected candidate is high
type6, i.e. has dN+1 = 1
7
5This reflects the fact that the decision maker may well not even consider other candidates if his
connection is strong enough.
6In this section, for convenience, I call “high type” a candidate with di = 1, and low type a
candidate with di = 0.
7If that were not the case the analysis would be less interesting, as the connected would be
chosen mostly on the basis of the personal premium c, and connections would be unambiguously
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The decision maker will pick the candidate that maximizes Vi = E(ai) + ci,
where ci = c for the connected candidate and ci = 0 for the others. Hence the
value of the candidate to the decision maker will be VN+1 = uN+1 + γ + c for the
connected candidate, and Vi = ui+γp for the non connected. The choice of choosing
someone connected or not therefore boils down to the choice between the connected
candidate and the non-connected with the highest ui. Conditional on not observing
the individual ui’s, the decision maker rationally believes the distribution of the
highest ui to be a β(N, 1) distribution
8, with expected value N
N+1 . This means that
the connected candidate will be chosen when:
uN+1 >
N
N + 1
− γ(1− p)− c
.
Ex ante, the probability that the connected candidate be chosen is therefore
Min
(
1, 1 − N
N+1 + γ(1− p) + c
)
. This is increasing in c (the personal value of
friendship), decreasing in p and increasing in γ (reflecting the value of the component
of the ability di, only observable for the connected), and decreasing in N (reflecting
the fact that asN increases, the expected quality of the best non-connected increases.
The parameter c introduces a conflict between the personal utility of the deci-
sion maker and the social optimum. The assumptions above make it easy to cal-
culate the expected social gain (or cost), denoted ∆W , of choosing the connected
candidate rather than the best non-connected. E(uN+1|connected is chosen) =
1
2Max
(
1, 1 + N
N+1 − γ(1− p)− c
)
, so:
E(∆W ) = γ(1 − p)− N
N + 1
+
1
2
Max
(
1, 1 +
N
N + 1
− γ(1− p)− c
)
socially harmful.
8This is a well documented property of the order statistics of a uniform between 0 and 1.
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Hence, when the connected candidate is chosen rather than the best non con-
nected, the organization may either gain (low p, high γ, low N , low c) or lose. Note
that a low p and a high γ correspond to a situation where the unobserved compo-
nent of ability is very important, in which case choosing a connected candidate who
is known to have di = 1 is likely preferable. A low N corresponds to a situation where
the pool of candidates is small, making it less likely to contain an outstanding non-
connected candidate. Finally, where c is 0, the decision maker faces incentives that
are well aligned with those of the organization, and therefore the availability of a con-
nected candidate is beneficial. With c = 0, E(∆W ) = 12
(
1 + γ(1− p)− N
N+1
)
> 0.
I now drop the assumption according to which the connected candidate has
dN+1 = 1, and instead assume that dN+1 also follow a Bernoulli distribution with
probability p. I want to compute and compare the probability that any given candi-
date be chosen for the vacancy, from the point of view of an external observer who
does not know the realization of dN+1. Indeed, this is close to the setting of the em-
pirical part of this paper, where I compare the likelihood of promotion of connected
and non-connected candidates without observing the ability of any candidate.
P (connected is chosen)
= P (dN+1 = 1)P (connected is chosen | dN+1 = 1)
+ P (dN+1 = 0)P (connected is chosen | dN+1 = 0)
=


1 if (γ, c,N, p) ∈ A
p+ (1− p)
(
1
N+1 − γp+ c
)
if (γ, c,N, p) ∈ B
1
N+1 + c if (γ, c,N, p) ∈ C
p
(
1
N+1 + γ(1 − p) + c
)
if (γ, c,N, p) ∈ D
p if (γ, c,N, p) ∈ E
In the equations above, regions A, B, C, D and E are regions of the (γ, c,N, p)
CHAPTER 2. SOCIAL CONNECTIONS AND PROMOTIONS 19
space defined as below:
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In region A, c is high enough that the connected candidate will always be chosen
regardless of ability. In region B, he will be chosen regardless of uN+1 if dN+1 = 1
(high type); however if dN+1 = 0 (low type) the connected candidate will only be
chosen if uN+1 is sufficiently high. In region C, the choice will depend on uN+1
for either value of dn+1. In regions D and E, c is low enough that the connected
candidate will never be chosen if dN+1 = 0; however if dN+1 = 1, the connected
candidate will be chosen for sure (in E) or for sufficiently high values of uN+1 (in
D).
As long as c is high enough that we are in regions A, B, or C, the likelihood of
choosing the connected candidate is higher than 1
N+1 , meaning that he is more likely
to be appointed than the average candidate. Note also that the existence of region
D depends on whether the intersection point between regions B, C, D, and E is for
a valid value of c (i.e. c ≥ 0). That is the case if and only if p ≥ 1
N+1 . In that
case, it is also the case that the connected candidate has a greater chance of being
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appointed than average in region E. Only in region D is it possibly the case that
the connected candidate is less likely than average to be chosen. That will be true
if γ is sufficiently low, creating a situation where the informational advantage of the
connected candidate is unlikely to play a large role even if he is known to be high
type (dN+1). Hence in that situation, either the connected candidate is low type (in
which case he won’t be chosen, by definition of region D); or he is high type, and
will compete mostly on the basis of his uN+1 (because γ is low), which is likely to
be much lower than the highest ui in the pool of non-connected candidates.
The previous discussion serves to show that in most cases the connected candidate
should be expected to be more likely to be picked than the average non-connected
candidate, even in a situation where there is very little favouritism. The informational
advantage that he enjoys is sufficient to give him an edge.
A possible extension for this model is to consider a risk-averse organization9.
Risk-aversion increases the appeal of the connected candidate, and reduces the appeal
of the non-connected.
This simple model therefore carries the following insights. (1) Where performance
is easy to observe (low γ), an influence of connections on promotions is socially
harmful. (2) Connections are more likely to be beneficial for risk-averse organizations
than for risk-neutral (or risk-loving) organizations. (3) Whether connections are
harmful or beneficial depends largely on their personal value c to the people in a
position to make promotion decisions. (4) The connected candidate almost always
has a higher probability of being picked. This is true even with no favouritism (c = 0).
The presence of favouritism further increases this probability.
9This is simple to do by using a concave objective function and using the expected utility
framework; but the algebra becomes unwieldy.
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2.3 Institution and Data
2.3.1 The Institutions10
The Catholic Church is a global religious organization headed by the Pope from
Vatican City, in Rome. The global decisions, e.g. on the doctrine of the Church, are
centralized in Rome; but most other decisions are taken at a local level. The local
decision-makers are bishops, generally heading a territory known as diocese.
These bishops in charge of a diocese are the focus of this study; however, other
individuals hold the title of bishop. First, retired bishops keep their title and are
referred to as Bishop Emeritus. They are entitled to a residence in the diocese which
they formerly headed. Second, a number of bishops (mostly cardinals) have their
career in Vatican City, helping the decision making of the Roman Curia. Thirdly,
the Apostolic Nuncios, diplomats for the Vatican in countries with a large catholic
community, have the title of bishop, even though their careers are mostly disjoint
from that of diocesan bishops (with very little mobility between those two career
paths, as the skill and formation required are considered different).
We focus here on the appointment of bishops involved in the management of
a diocese. Again, within this category are several titles. First, ordinary bishops,
the most common, are the individuals at the head of a diocese, meaning that every
diocese has exactly one ordinary bishop11. Second, auxiliary bishops are appointed
in many dioceses to assist the ordinary bishop. This is mostly common in larger
dioceses (see table 2.1 for the distribution of the number of auxiliary bishops across
dioceses). Third, coadjutor bishops can be appointed. The role of a coadjutor bishop
is to act as auxiliary bishop until the ordinary bishop retires or die, upon which
10The sources for this section are Canon Law (1983), Reese (1989) and Reese (1996), as well
as a conversation with John Arnold, Auxiliary Bishop of the Diocese of Westminster in London.
Relevant canons are quoted in the Appendix.
11Except in the transitory period where a bishop died, retired, or left the diocese. This situation
is denoted as sede vacante, meaning “vacant see”.
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Table 2.1: Number of aux-
iliary bishops per diocese
in 1983: frequency table
Item Number Per cent
0 1,867 82.7
1 271 12.0
2 64 2.8
3 27 1.2
4 8 0.4
5 12 0.5
6 5 0.2
7 1 0.0
8 1 0.0
9 1 0.0
Total 2,257 100.0
circumstance the coadjutor will automatically take his succession. In this paper, I
treat the appointment as a coadjutor as the appointment to ordinary (since de facto,
most coadjutors succeed within a year or two of their appointment, meaning that
they are deemed ready to be an ordinary). This institution is meant to assist ill or
fatigued ordinaries and to ensure a smooth transition.
Every country with a strong Catholic presence is partitioned into dioceses. The
size and number of dioceses varies a lot across countries; typically, countries with a
long Catholic history and a large Catholic community today have a dense diocese web
(e.g. Italy, France); countries with a smaller Catholic community, or a shorter history
of catholicism, have a sparser web (United States, Germany..). Diocese boundaries
sometimes follow the boundaries of other subdivisions (either current or historical),
e.g. regions, states, etc. Dioceses with particular significance, whether because
of their larger size or because of a remarkable history, are called archdioceses and
headed by an archbishop. This prefix is purely honorific; there are ordinary, auxiliary,
and coadjutor archbishops. It is associated with the diocese more than with the
individual, even though in a small number of cases, the Vatican can choose to honour
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the bishop of a regular diocese with the title of archbishop. Such examples, however,
are too rare to be meaningful for this study.
Dioceses are largely independent from each other, and ordinary bishops have,
de facto, absolute power over their diocese. This includes the finances, catholic
institutions (schools, hospitals), personnel management, etc. A bishop is a high level
manager, responsible for a workforce often in excess of one thousand priests and
members of religious institutes, and for assets of sometimes considerable value. A
bishop’s compensation is a fixed stipend set at the diocesan level, and appears to be
of the same order of magnitude (though higher) than a priest’s with similar tenure12.
There is no performance pay, and virtually no chance of being demoted. Work
incentives are therefore intrinsic motivation and promotion prospects. A bishop is
required by Canon Law to reside in the diocese, and to offer to retire at 7513.
Within countries, dioceses are grouped into ecclesiastical provinces. These are
clusters of variable size, usually 3 to 6 dioceses (see table 2.2). Each ecclesiastical
province has one main diocese, often an archdiocese, called the metropolitan diocese;
the others are called suffragan dioceses. This is mostly a historical feature, with little
relevance today; in particular, the metropolitan bishop has no meaningful formal
authority over his suffragans14. However, ecclesiastical provinces still play a role
where bishop appointments are concerned, as will be explained below.
A bishop vacancy opens in three situations: when a bishop moves, retires or dies;
when an ordinary bishop wants an additional auxiliary (which he can only do with
a permission from Rome); or, more rarely, when a new diocese is created.
In each of these situations, a process starts which aims to find a priest or an
existing bishop who would fit the vacancy. The process is slightly different depending
12Accurate information on bishop stipends is hard to obtain. Most dioceses do not make their
financial reports available publicly, and those that do have only done so for a few years.
13This retirement age was introduced after the Second Vatican Council, in 1966. Before that,
bishops were free to work as long as their health allowed.
14See Canon 436 of the Code of Canon Law for details.
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Table 2.2: Number of
dioceses per ecclesiastical
province: frequency table
Item Number Per cent
1 25 4.5
2 25 4.5
3 118 21.2
4 108 19.4
5 109 19.6
6 58 10.4
7 43 7.7
8 31 5.6
9 15 2.7
10 11 2.0
11 3 0.5
12 5 0.9
13 3 0.5
14 1 0.2
18 1 0.2
20 1 0.2
Total 557.0 100.0
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on whether the vacancy is for an ordinary or an auxiliary bishop. In the case of an
auxiliary bishop, the ordinary bishop of that diocese (i.e. the hierarchical superior of
the future appointee) is to choose a list of three candidates, called the terna, that he
deems able to fulfill the role, which he then sends to the Nuncio. Usually the Nuncio
will send those same three names directly to the Vatican for the final choice, though
he is formally allowed to amend this list if he finds it necessary.
In the case of an ordinary bishop, the person who defines the terna is the apos-
tolic Nuncio to the country of the vacancy. To do this, he has to contact a number
of agents, and in particular the bishops in the relevant ecclesiastical province. They
can provide him with information about promising priests and bishops whom they
consider suitable for the job. He will also approach priests who work with the can-
didates. His role is to narrow down the list of candidates to three names (the terna)
and to provide, for each of those three names, an extensive file containing interviews,
references, and any relevant information. He then sends this file to the Vatican,
where the final choice is to be made.
Once the terna reaches the Vatican, it is discussed by the Congregation for Bish-
ops (the ministry of the Vatican in charge of bishop appointments, staffed primarily
with Italian cardinals), which makes a recommendation for the Pope. The Pope has
the last word. If none of the names in the terna is deemed satisfactory, the Vati-
can contacts the Nuncio (or ordinary bishop, in the case of the appointment of an
auxiliary) and asks for three new names to be sent.
The whole process is explained in much more details, in Reese (1989). Reese only
describes the situation in the US, but the process is fairly universal, at least de jure.
I observe, in my sample, a total of 13195 bishop appointments, which corre-
sponds to all bishop appointments decided by the Congregation for bishops or the
Congregation for the Evangelization of People in the Vatican. Excluded are the ones
depending on the Congregation for the Oriental Churches, that is to say the appoint-
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ments of bishops (or equivalent, e.g. patriarchs) in the Eastern Catholic Churches.
For the sake of homogeneity of institutions, I focus on the Latin rite. Out of these
13195, 67% (8828) correspond to appointments of former priests; 34% correspond
to promotions of existing bishops. Out of the 8828 appointments of new bishops,
64% (5630) become ordinary bishops; the rest become auxiliary bishops (25%) or
coadjutor bishops (11%).
Idendifying what constitutes a promotion in this labour market is not trivial.
Several types of mobility can be observed, e.g. from auxiliary bishop of an archdiocese
to ordinary bishop of a smaller diocese. I denote dv a vacant diocese and db the former
diocese of bishop b, and as ∆cat(db, dv) the growth in number of catholics in between
db and dv, i.e. ∆cat(db, dv) = log(catholicsdv ) − log(catholicsdb ). Figure (2.1) gives
the distribution of ∆cat for a number of cases, namely (1) OO : an ordinary bishop
appointed as ordinary bishop of another diocese (2236 cases, 17% of appointments);
(2) OA: an ordinary bishop appointed as auxiliary bishop of another diocese (91 cases,
.7% of appointments); (3) AO : an auxiliary bishop appointed as ordinary bishop of
another (or the same) diocese (1929 cases, 15% of appointments); and (4) AA: an
auxiliary bishop appointed as auxiliary bishop of another diocese (111 cases, 1% of
appointments). As this graph shows, most OO and OA appointments correspond
to a move to a bigger diocese; AA shows no clear pattern; AO usually corresponds
to a move to a smaller diocese (but more responsibilities), with a mass point at 0
corresponding to auxiliaries promoted to ordinary of the same diocese.
In this study, I will treat as a promotion: (1) any appointment of type AO, and (2)
any appointment of type OO corresponding to a move to a bigger diocese (in terms of
number of catholics). In my analysis of promotions, I only focus on appointments as
ordinary, because (as seen above) existing bishops are rarely appointed as auxiliary.
Given their rarity, including such appointments would add little benefit, yet would
complicate the analysis needlessly.
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Figure 2.1: Diocese size differential upon bishop promotions. The graph “Auxiliary
to Ordinary” has a mass point at 0, corresponding to bishops being appointed as
ordinary of their diocese. Each bar has a width of .5.
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2.3.2 The Data
The data for this study comes primarily from the Annuario Pontificios. These are
books, released every year by the Vatican, giving a complete snapshot of the Catholic
hierarchy throughout the world. They includes, for every diocese, the names, age and
place of birth of the ordinary bishop and, where applicable, of the auxiliary bishops.
Also indicated (but not used in this study) are the names of the vicars general,
who are the most important priests in the diocese. Diocese characteristics are also
given, including population, area, number of catholics, of baptisms, of churches...
This data aggregates the answers to a questionnaire sent each year by the Vatican
to every ordinary bishop. Although the annuarios have been released since the end
of the 19th century, I focus on appointments from 1930 onwards.
A major limitation of this data is that individuals can only be observed after they
become bishops. The only indications on their earlier life are the place and date of
birth, as well as the date of ordination as a priest. Many priests grow up and work
in their diocese of birth, and most in their province of birth, but that is not always
the case. Of interest too would be the place of seminary.
Missing from the Annuario Pontificio are the geographical coordinates of the
dioceses (necessary to compute the distance between a bishop and a vacancy, or
between two bishops, which is crucial to the analysis). To obtain these, I downloaded
data containing the coordinates (latitude and longitude) of all cities with a population
higher than 10,000 from GeoNames, a free geographical database. I then matched the
names of all dioceses to this database. The match quality is good overall, with only
7% dioceses with missing coordinates. A map of the dioceses included in the sample
can be found as figure 2.2. The figure makes a number of things apparent. First, the
geographical size of dioceses varies a lot across countries15, reflecting differences in
15Diocese boundaries are not visible, but the average geographical size has an inverse relationship
with the spacing between the dots. For example, dioceses in North America cover a larger area on
average than in Western Europe.
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history and demography. Second, certain regions of the world are totally absent from
my sample, e.g. Greece and Russia. This is either because catholicism is (virtually)
absent in these regions (e.g. because the Orthodox Church dominates), or because
catholicism follows rites other than the latin rite, and hence are outside the scope of
this study.
A number of variables come from different sources, and matching of those sources,
to this date, is imperfect. The data on bishop promotions is exhaustive; but the data
on diocese characteristics (e.g. number of catholics per diocese) comes from year 1983.
Depending on how much they vary with time, it is not very clear how accurately these
variables describe the situation in 1930 (the start of the sample period). Data on
birthplaces is imperfectly matched16; however unmatched observations (i.e. bishops
for which I do not have the diocese of birth17) are as-if-randomly picked, and hence
should not affect my estimation results other than through a loss of efficiency or
an understatement of the effect. Data on diocese coordinates is, as said above, well
matched overall, although coordinates for a few hundred dioceses are missing. Again,
I expect those to be close to randomly picked. Finally, even for 1983, a number of
diocese characteristics have missing observations. In the annuario pontificio, variables
are given as missing both when they are actually missing and when they are zero. I
use in my estimations the variables that are the most rarely missing (and the least
likely to be zero), namely for example the number of catholics and number of priests.
Catholic influence changed over the studied period, growing in some regions (e.g.
Africa, South America) and declining in others (e.g. Western Europe in recent
decades). A side effect of these dynamics is that diocese boundaries are not con-
stant. Depending on the evolving needs and demography of each region, dioceses
16For all bishops, the Annuario Pontificio indicates the town and diocese of birth. The data I
got from catholic-hierarchy.org, however, only indicates the town of birth, making matching with
dioceses non-trivial. Using Optical Character Recognition methods on scans of the Annuarios, I
was able to match town of birth to dioceses in about 60% of the cases.
17Meaning that some connections are missing for these bishops
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Figure 2.2: Map of dioceses in 1983. Each dot represents a diocese.
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may split or merge, or two dioceses may transfer a part of their territory from one
to the other. As of now I have no really satisfactory way to incorporate these events
in this study. Such changes are rare enough that they can be ignored with no major
consequence on the estimates. Hence, I take 1983 as the year of reference for dio-
cese boundaries; I effectively ignore deviations from the 1983 map of dioceses. But
a more satisfactory (and tedious) way to proceed would be to systematically track
these changes in boundaries.
Table 2.3 gives summary statistics for dioceses as of 1983. The large standard
deviations reflect the heterogeneity of dioceses, with the smallest more than 3 orders
of magnitude smaller than the biggest (as measured, for example, by number of
catholics).
2.4 Model, estimation and results
2.4.1 Model
The unit of observation I use in my estimation is a vacancy. Each time a vacancy
appears, a person is chosen to fill it among the population of priests and bishops of
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Table 2.3: Diocese summary statistic for year 1983.
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
Area (sq. km) 39,646 (125,634) 1 2,550,000 2,176
Population 1,394,381 (2,839,558) 5,650 40,000,000 2,177
Catholics 357,584 (546,058) 1,000 8,600,000 2,190
Baptisms 8,119 (12,191) 2 165,470 2,075
Parishes 95.8 (143) 1 1,127 2,132
Churches 57.7 (106) 1 998 1,085
Priests 114 (198) 1 2,376 2,160
Seminarians 22.3 (32.4) 1 352 2,044
Auxiliary bishops 0.277 (0.787) 0 9 2,258
Vicars General 0.918 (0.619) 0 6 2,258
% of dioceses in Italy 0.118
% of dioceses in Europe (other) 0.174
% of dioceses in Africa 0.147
% of dioceses in South America 0.183
% of dioceses in North America 0.131
% of dioceses in Oceania 0.028
% of dioceses in Asia 0.175
the considered country.
My model for the choice of a bishop to fill vacancy v is an Additive Random
Utility Model (ARUM), i.e. the candidate providing the highest “utility” is chosen
as bishop. The decision-making involves all the individuals who are going to provide
the Vatican with information about the candidates. This information is primarily
provided by the people in the ecclesiastical province where the vacancy arises, as they
are the ones whom Canon law explicitly requires the Apostolic Nuncio to consult.
The objective function of interest is that which the Pope attempts to maximize, given
all the information brought to him by the local bishops, the Apostolic Nuncio, and
the Congregation for Bishops. I will use simply the word “utility” in this section, in
the name of consistency with the literature on ARUM.
I consider that the utility function has two components. One describes how good
a fit the bishop is for this vacancy given characteristics directly observable by the
Vatican, e.g. given his previous appointments, his publicly known achievements,
etc. The other component reflects information given to the Vatican by the agents
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it consults; this component will be affected by the social connections of the bishop.
I assume that these components, as well as the error term, enter additively in the
utility function. Neither of these two components can be perfectly observed by the
econometrician; but some information at least is available for both.
I write the utility from having bishop b fill vacancy v in year y as:
Uvby = Xvbyβ + γ
Kvby∑
k
vkby + εvby (2.1)
where: X denotes a set of variables directly observable by the Vatican relative to
the suitability of the match; k denotes the individuals who will be contacted by the
Vatican if b is considered for v; vkby reflects the information that k provides to the
Vatican about b in year y. (vkby therefore incorporates both the favouritism effect
and the information effect mentioned earlier.) εvby denotes a random component re-
flecting any element affecting the perceived quality of the match that is not captured
by the other variables.
Upon receiving the reports of vkby, it is likely the case that the Vatican is aware
that personal relationships can get in the way of objective evaluation of a candidate’s
suitability for the vacancy. Nonetheless it is clearly not in the Vatican’s interest to
dismiss entirely reports from the individuals who are known to have interacted most
closely with the candidates, as they are also the ones who know the most about them.
It is obvious that the Vatican has access to much more information about each
candidate and vacancy than are publicly available or can realistically be obtained.
Information about the needs of the diocese, the personality of the previous bishop
and of the candidates, the finances of the diocese, and so on, cannot be realistically
included as regressors. Also missing in my analysis is information about the pool of
priests in the country, since I only have information on individuals who will eventually
become bishops.
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The proxies I will use for
∑Kvby
k vkby are variables that give an indication of how
likely bishop b is to be connected to people who will have an influence in the filling of
vacancy v. Among those people are the Apostolic Nuncio, and the bishops in place in
the province where the vacancy arises. I do not observe connections to the Nuncio18,
and can only infer connections to existing bishops, in the manner described in the
next paragraphs. For the rest of the paper, when I have to refer to two connected
bishops, I will refer to the one considered for the vacancy as “candidate” and the one
possibly helping the former as “incumbent”.
I allow for a connection to exist between two bishops if, at any point in the past,
they have been working synchronously in dioceses that are geographically close (as
defined, depending on the specification, either by the two dioceses belonging to the
same ecclesiastical province, or by the distance between the two dioceses being less
than a cutoff value). The connection (or likelihood of connection) is allowed to be
decreasingly intense with distance, in space or (in one specification) in time19. As
this is the variable of interest in this study, a few points about its construction are
to be emphasized.
I include as candidates for a vacancy all the bishops in the country aged 35 to
70, and who are either auxiliary bishops, or ordinary bishops in a smaller diocese
than the vacant one. The connections that I include on the right hand side are those
with incumbent bishops in the province of the vacancy, meaning either auxiliary of
ordinary bishops who are in a position to affect the process of choosing the next
bishop.
I only keep connections that are terminated at the time of the vacancy, with
one or the other of the bishops having moved some time before the vacancy arose.
18Nuncios are overwhelmingly Italians, and are very mobile across countries; therefore in most
cases, they are unlikely to have strong connections with the bishops they appoint.
19That is to say, a connection that ended long ago (e.g. with one of the bishops changing ap-
pointments) is allowed to have less effect than a more recent connection
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I exclude ongoing connections. Including them is problematic as the result of two
considerations: first, they do not generate interesting variations. All the local can-
didates will have very similar ongoing connections (as the relevant connections are
connections to bishops in the ecclesiastical proyvince of the vacancy). Hence ongoing
connections typically do not discriminate meaningfully between the likely candidates.
Second, local candidates have ongoing connections with all the local bishops, but also
differ from faraway candidates in other respects – including how well they know the
region, the local priests, etc. These effects are already captured by controls such as
distance between candidate and vacancy, but likely not perfectly. Excluding ongoing
connections therefore seems preferable20. In practice, I only retain connections that
were formed while the incumbent was in a province other than that of the vacancy.
In some specifications, I only take into account connections formed after the first
appointment as bishop (I use the shorthand “bishop connections” for these specifica-
tions). In others, I also count as connections people who were born in the vicinity
of each other (using the shorthand “all connections”), making the strong assumption
that people remain in their diocese of birth until they become appointed as bishop.
It is generally not exactly accurate; however, a majority of bishops do remain in their
province of birth during their priesthood. Given that dioceses within a province are
close to each other, and given that my definition of connection is based on distance,
mobility within a province is not a major concern.
Some of the more sophisticated specifications allow for a gradual attenuation of
the effect of a connection with distance between the connected bishops – however,
most specifications here rely on the existence of a cutoff. Distances below the cutoff
are counted as allowing a connection; distances above the cutoff are not. I report
results for cutoff values of 100 km and 200 km.
20In fact, including them does not change the results substantially. The point estimates barely
change; the standard errors are somewhat reduced.
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In most specifications, I only retain connections with active incumbents; in others,
as a specification test I allow for connections with retired or dead incumbents to have
an effect.
I model vkby as
vkby = α exp(−Zkbyγ) (2.2)
where Z can include, for example, a measure of distance between the dioceses
when the connection was ongoing, and how long ago the connection was terminated.
In most specifications, for simplicity, Z will in fact be zero (or infinity, if k and b are
not connected), and all connections will be assumed to have the same effect.
2.4.2 Estimation method
Given the ARUM framework described above, the most natural method of estimation
is the GEV (Generalized Extreme Value) family of estimators, which includes as
special case the conditional logit specification which I use here. Using the vocabulary
of multinomial models, a case here is a vacancy and an alternative is a bishop.
Compared to most applications of multinomial models, this setup has a number
of features that must be noted. First, even though the decision making is a complex
process involving several dozens of individuals, the Pope always has the last word.
Over the period considered, the number of Popes is small (seven), and the institutions
fairly stable. This lends credibility to the view that the objective function was
relatively homogenous throughout, and that its parameters can be safely assumed
to be constant. Second, the number of alternatives available for each vacancy is
considerable, since any bishop or priest (or even, in certain rare cases, other members
of the catholic community) can be chosen to fill the vacancy. This implies that all
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the regressors are bound to be alternative-specific, as identification with case-specific
regressors relies on each alternative being picked several times21. Third, the set of
alternatives, or choice set, varies a lot across vacancies. Dead, unborn or foreign
bishops cannot be chosen, which means that the set of alternatives varies with time
and geography. More specifically, I retain, as my choice set, {bishops living in the
country of vacancy v and aged between 35 and 75}.
The conditional logit specification is subject to the IIA (independence on irrele-
vant alternatives) property. IIA in this context means that the relative probability of
choosing bishop b1 over bishop b2 does not depend on the characteristics or number
of the other candidates. This is plausible, and testable. Performing tests based on
the Hausman-McFadden approach as described in Hausman and McFadden (1984)22
indicates that the data fails to contradict the IIA, validating the conditional logit
specification.
The main concern is that of endogeneity of social connections. If I had access to
perfect information on the degree of connectedness between any pair of bishops in the
data (including, for example, the belief of each bishop about the ability of each other
bishop), and if I built a measure of connectedness of each bishop based on this perfect
information, then I would arguably have a more accurate measure of connectedness;
but one also, crucially, more crippled with endogeneity. Unobservables exist, such as
interpersonal skills, that affect the connectedness of a bishop, and are at the same
time valued in this labour market (hence will affect Uvby above and beyond the effect
of connectedness). If unable to control for ability, the effect of connections would
then be overestimated. However, given my coarser proxies for social connections, this
is not as much of a concern here. My measure is only a function of the history of the
21This is the distinction between conditional logit, including alternative-specific regressors (as
here), and multinomial logit, including case-specific regressors
22This approach relies on the fact that if the IIA holds, then the estimates should be robust to
dropping a random subsample of the alternatives.
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bishop–where he was born, and where he was appointed in his early career. Since I
also control for characteristics of the diocese of previous appointment, exogeneity of
my measure of social connections is a more credible assumption than if I had a more
accurate measure. Using the language of the intrumental variables literature, what I
estimate is ultimately a reduced form. I do not observe the endogenous variable and
hence cannot perform an IV estimation; but the reduced form itself is of interest23.
2.4.3 Results
New or existing bishop?
For descriptive purposes, we focus first on the decision to appoint a new bishop rather
than an existing bishop using a binary logit specification. Results are reported in
table (2.4). Column (1) shows that in general a priest would less likely be chosen
over a bishop for an ordinary vacancy than an auxiliary vacancy. But, as column (2)
shows, this no longer holds if we control for the size of the diocese: only big dioceses
have auxiliaries, and for small dioceses, one is more likely to appoint someone new as
ordinary than an existing bishop. Finally, it seems that the tenure of the apostolic
nuncio in the country considered is (slightly) positively correlated with a higher
probability of appointing a priest–perhaps because the nuncio has better knowledge
of the pool of able priests.
Conditional logit
From now on, all specifications are run on the subset of appointments such that:
(1) the appointee is an existing bishop; and (2) the vacancy is for an ordinary bish-
ops (because there are only a couple of hundred cases of an existing bishop being
23It is arguably the case that the effect of the connections that I infer is not very different from the
effect of the connections that I do not observe; i.e. that a bishop who was my neighbour during my
early career has a similar effect on my career as a bishop whom I know equally well from different
(unobservable) circumstances (e.g. seminary or bishop conference).
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Table 2.4: Decision to appoint a new bishop or promote an existing
bishop
(1) (2) (3)
Priest Priest Priest
Ordinary -2.462*** 3.678*** 4.266***
(0.0748) (0.959) (1.063)
Catholics -0.0353 -0.00737
(0.0680) (0.0749)
Ordinary ∗ Catholics -0.517*** -0.550***
(0.0711) (0.0786)
Tenure of nuncio (years) 0.0160***
(0.00553)
Constant 2.754*** 3.315*** 2.695***
(0.0720) (0.924) (1.021)
Observations 13322 11741 8882
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Dependent variable = 1 if chosen candidate is a priest; 0 if already a
bishop.
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appointed as auxiliary: most auxiliary appointments go to priests).
In these, and in all subsequent conditional logit specifications, reported standard
errors are based on the observed information matrix.
Table (2.6) gives results for different sets of controls, excluding any measure of
connections (though the regressors “distance” and “Same Province” may be thought
of as capturing some effect of connections to local bishops.)
The variable “Density” refers to the inverse of the average of the square root of
the areas of dioceses in the country considered.
Density =
#dioceses in the country∑
d∈dioceses in the country
√
Aread
(2.3)
For example, if dioceses in country A have four times the area of dioceses in
country B, the density of country A will be half of that in country B.
This variable is meant to account for the fact that distance may play a different
role in different countries. In a country with very high density like Italy, distance may
start playing a role for very short distances (a few dozen kilometers); in the US, where
dioceses are much larger, distances of a few dozen kilometers seem mostly irrelevant.
The interaction of distance and density can therefore be interpreted either as a usual
interaction term (added effect of distance for countries with a certain density), or
as a variable in its own right (holding absolute distance constant): this product,
given the definition I take for density, represents the distance counted in terms of
the average radius of dioceses in the country. A value of 2, for example, means a
distance of two average dioceses.
Table (2.5) gives descriptive statistics for most controls.
Column (1) is a limited set of controls; column (2) is the full set of controls that
I use throughout the rest of the study. Local bishops are more likely to be appointed
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Variable N Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
log catholics if OO 1373 11.99245 (1.146985) 7.824046 14.57912
log catholics if AO 1555 13.33079 (1.186076) 7.824046 15.96727
AO 2928 .5310792 (.4991184) 0 1
Distance 2928 371.6179 (495.3426) 0 3975.68
Distance ∗Density 2928 2.751598 (3.293844) 0 31.24728
Age 2928 55.20506 (7.085446) 35.73443 70.68309
Total tenure as bishop 2928 8.001607 (5.648679) -18.2642 33.96851
Tenure at previous appointment 2928 7.035798 (4.772059) .1149897 37.21013
Born in province of vacancy 2928 .1697404 (.3754687) 0 1
Born in diocese of vacancy 2928 .0665984 (.2493677) 0 1
Worked in province of vacancy 2928 .4043716 (.4908538) 0 1
Table 2.5: Descriptive statistics of regressors for successful candidates.
(and distance, as suspected, plays a larger role in dense countries); bishops with a
low tenure at their current position, less likely.
The controls for the size (measured in log number of catholics) of the diocese
of origin and vacant diocese are difficult to interpret, due to the interaction terms.
The flexibility that this specification allows is necessary for a clean identification. A
careful interpretation of these size effects is however possible.
Auxiliaries are more likely to be promoted to ordinary if they come from a large
diocese. The effect of size of diocese of origin is more intricate for ordinary candidates.
If the size of the vacant diocese is small, then ordinaries from small dioceses are
favored; for larger vacant dioceses, ordinaries from larger dioceses are favored. For
average sized dioceses, the effect is undetermined.
For a large diocese of origin and small vacant diocese, the results from column
(2) imply that auxiliary candidates are more likely to be appointed; but for small
diocese of origin and large vacant diocese, ordinaries are favoured.
The next regression output table (2.8) introduces the connection variables, and
produces estimates based on them. Each of the three columns is a specification
including the full set of controls, in addition to the variables indicated on the row of
the table. These new variables are defined based on an underlying variable which,
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Table 2.6: Conditional logit – no connection controls
(1) (2)
log(catholics)cand ∗ log(catholics)vac ∗OO 0.173∗∗∗ 0.175∗∗∗
(0.0192) (0.0202)
log(catholics)cand ∗ log(catholics)vac ∗AO 0.121∗∗∗ 0.114∗∗∗
(0.0162) (0.0170)
log(catholics)cand ∗OO -2.328∗∗∗ -2.431∗∗∗
(0.252) (0.265)
log(catholics)cand ∗AO 1.465∗∗∗ 1.384∗∗∗
(0.231) (0.243)
AO -19.03∗∗∗ -18.00∗∗∗
(2.939) (3.112)
Distance -0.000954∗∗∗ -0.00109∗∗∗
(0.0000969) (0.000134)
Distance ∗Density -0.225∗∗∗ -0.235∗∗∗
(0.0138) (0.0208)
(Distance)2 -0.000000280∗∗
(9.59e-08)
(Distance)2 ∗Density 0.000127∗∗∗
(0.0000228)
Age -0.0365∗∗∗
(0.00363)
Age ∗OO -0.0364∗∗∗
(0.00503)
Age ∗AO -0.0529∗∗∗
(0.00454)
Total tenure as bishop -0.0128∗ 0.0343∗
(0.00636) (0.0172)
Tenure at previous appointment 0.0447∗∗∗ 0.852∗∗∗
(0.00653) (0.0500)
(Total tenure as bishop)2 -0.00198∗∗
(0.000656)
(Tenure at previous appointment)2 -0.0937∗∗∗
(0.00725)
(Tenure at previous appointment)3 0.00383∗∗∗
(0.000405)
(Tenure at previous appointment)4 -0.0000516∗∗∗
(0.00000737)
Candidate born in province of vacancy 0.366∗∗∗
(0.0852)
Candidate born in diocese of vacancy 0.565∗∗∗
(0.125)
Candidate worked in province of vacancy 0.892∗∗∗
(0.0591)
Observations 207716 207716
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Dependent variable = 1 if candidate is chosen for the vacancy. Full set of controls
included.
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Table 2.7: Frequency table
of the number of connec-
tions for successful candi-
dates
Item Number Per cent
0 2,357 80.50
1 419 14.31
2 121 4.13
3 19 0.65
4 9 0.31
5 3 0.1
Total 2,928 100.0
for every pair of incumbent and candidate, takes value one if they are connected
(according to the criterion described in the previous section) and value zero otherwise.
• Variable dConn takes value 1 if the candidate considered is connected to at
least one incumbent; 0 otherwise. (It is the maximum, for each candidate, of
the underlying variable described above).
• Variable nConn takes for value the total number of incumbents that the can-
didate is connected to. (It is the sum of the underlying connection variable).
• Variable nConnSq is the square of nConn, included here to allow for non-
constant returns to connectedness.
The frequency table of the resulting nConn variable is given in table (2.7).
I find a strongly significant effect of connections on the likelihood of promotions.
Taking the relative probability at the average values of covariates, these results mean
that a bishop with one connection is about 40% more likely to be promoted than
one with none. The effect of connections show decreasing returns with the number
of connections, with an estimated maximum effect at three connections.
The next table (2.9) breaks down the results above by country (only the con-
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Table 2.8: Conditional logit results
(1) (2) (3)
dConn 0.321∗∗∗
(0.0583)
nConn 0.208∗∗∗ 0.369∗∗∗
(0.0416) (0.0813)
nConn2 -0.0757∗
(0.0338)
Observations 207716 207716 207716
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Dependent variable = 1 if candidate is chosen for the
vacancy. Full set of controls included.
nection variable is allowed to have different effects across countries; all the other
coefficients are constrained to be the same). This allows us to study potential vari-
ations in the size of the effect of connection across countries. However we note that
the results seem remarkably stable over space. It is worth noting that there is no
significant effect for countries other than the Americas and Europe; however those
are in a minority, and the standard error is too large to interpret with confidence.
I do not report here the results from a similar breakdown over time instead; but
the conclusion is the same: there does not seem to be a significant evolution of the
size of the effect studied here over the time range of the data (1930 to 2008).
In table (2.10) I relax some of the assumptions that underly the definition of a
connection, namely (1) instead of setting the relevant boundary for connections as
being that of the ecclastical province, I introduce a distance cutoff of either 100km
to 200km, and any bishop within this distance is considered a connection; and (2)
results are reported where connections are only measured after individuals become
bishops (i.e., not using the information on their place of birth). Specifications using
this subset of connections are referred to as using “bishop connections”, by opposition
to “all connections”.
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Table 2.9: Conditional logit results across countries.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
dConn 0.321∗∗∗
(0.0583)
dConn ∗Other Europe 0.275∗∗
(0.119)
dConn ∗ Italy 0.577∗∗∗
(0.135)
dConn ∗ South America 0.394∗∗∗
(0.114)
dConn ∗North America 0.291∗∗
(0.113)
dConn ∗Other -0.064
(0.185)
nConn 0.208∗∗∗
(0.0416)
nConn ∗Other Europe 0.114
(0.0854)
nConn ∗ Italy 0.342∗∗∗
(0.0877)
nConn ∗ South America 0.297∗∗∗
(0.0874)
nConn ∗North America 0.238∗∗
(0.0825)
nConn ∗Other -0.0056
(0.118)
Observations 207716 207716 207716 207716
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Dependent variable = 1 if candidate is chosen for the vacancy. Full set of
controls included.
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Table 2.10: Conditional logit results: alternative specifications.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Connection type all all all bishop bishop bishop
Distance cutoff province 100km 200km province 100km 200km
nConn 0.369∗∗∗ 0.398∗∗∗ 0.269∗∗∗ 0.463∗∗∗ 0.465∗∗ 0.252∗∗
(0.0813) (0.0793) (0.0505) (0.157) (0.145) (0.0839)
nConn2 -0.0757∗ -0.0732∗ -0.0240∗ -0.114 -0.114 -0.0513
(0.0337) (0.0313) (0.0119) (0.0900) (0.0794) (0.0304)
Observations 207716 207716 207716 207716 207716 207716
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Dependent variable = 1 if candidate is chosen for the vacancy. Columns (1), (2) and (3):
all connections; columns (4), (5) and (6): bishop connections; columns (1) and (4): cutoff =
province boundary; columns (2) and (5): cutoff = 100km; columns (3) and (6): cutoff = 200km.
Full set of controls included.
Results do not seem to vary significantly with the choice of specification; how-
ever, dropping the connections made before the first bishop appointment results in
a considerable loss of efficiency, as indicated by the soaring standard errors. Hence
for the rest of the study, I consider all connections, including those inferred from the
place of birth.
“Placebo” specifications: connections to dead bishops
The data allows the researcher to build the connection variables not only for live
incumbents, but also for moved, retired, or deceased ones. One would expect the
effect of a connection to drop to zero, or at least be considerably reduced, as the
connected incumbent dies; and be at least somewhat reduced as he moves to another
province or retires. He will not be able to weigh in as actively as incumbents in office;
however, a retired or faraway bishop can still be consulted by the nuncio, and a dead
bishop may have talked to live incumbents about possible candidates before dying.
Such an indirect recommendation could thus still explain some positive correlation.
Table (2.11) features two specifications; in each, I include one actual connection
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Table 2.11: Conditional logit results:
Placebo specifications.
(1) (2)
nConn 0.272∗∗∗ 0.283∗∗∗
(0.0780) (0.0652)
Placebo nConn 0.0376 0.0610
(0.0948) (0.0601)
Observations 207716 207716
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Dependent variable = 1 if candidate is
chosen for the vacancy. Column (1):
Placebo connections are connections to
bishops (dead or alive) who (at the time of
the vacancy) are no longer incumbents in
the province of the vacancy. Column (2):
Placebo connections are past connections
to incumbents who are now dead (at the
time of the vacancy). Full set of controls
included.
control, and one placebo. In column (1), the actual control corresponds to connec-
tions with active incumbents, and the placebo to connections with bishops who are
no longer in exercise in the province of the vacancy (whatever the cause: mobility,
retirement, or death). Column (2) restricts the placebo to dead bishops.
The results validate the identification. Both specifications indicate that placebo
connections have no significant effect on the likelihood of promotion. A test of
equality of the effects of connections to incumbents and former incumbents (column
1) is rejected with a p-value of .0186; the same test for dead incumbents (column 2)
has a p-value of .0685.
In the same spirit, figure (2.3) reports the regression coefficients (along with 95%
confidence intervals) corresponding to a specification including (in addition to the
full set of controls) a complete set of connection controls, broken down with respect
to the date of death (respectively departure) of the incumbent. Points to the left of
zero correspond to connections with bishops who are about to move or die; to the
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Figure 2.3: Placebo coefficients: negative years are coefficients on connections with
bishops still alive or in place; positive years correspond to connections with bishops
who are no longer in exercise in the province of the vacancy.
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right, bishops who moved or died some time ago. Each regressor covers two years:
for example, one of them is “Number of connections with bishops who are going to
die in 1 or 2 years”. These graphs indicate a decrease in the effect of connections that
is synchronous with the death or mobility of the incumbent (though not very clearly,
as this pushes the data to its limits, and the standard error for each coefficient is
large).
Continuous attenuation with distance
So far, all specifications constrained the effect of connections to be binary: connec-
tions between bishops distant by less than a cutoff value (boundary of the province,
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or distance of 100km or 200km) are predicted to have a constant effect; connections
between bishops separated by a larger distance are expected either not to exist, or
not to have any effect. This is of course at odds with the complexity of reality
(even though probably valid as an approximation). In this section, we estimate a
slightly more complicated specification, where connections enter the right hand side
interacted with a term that features attenuation with distance, and there is no such
arbitrary cutoff (connections corresponding to any distance within a country are
included).
More precisely, looking again at the functional form for vkby (the term through
which connections between b and k affect the objective function of the Vatican) we
have:
vkby = α exp(−Zkbyγ) (2.4)
So far Z was set equal to 0; here we include in it variables that are expected to
possibly have an effect on the strength of the connection between b and k:
• The duration of the connection, labelled DurConn.
• The time elapsed since the connection was terminated, labelled SinceConn.
• The distance between the candidate and the incumbent at the time the con-
nection was live, labelled DistConn.
All the other controls are unchanged, and still enter the utility function linearly.
The results for these new specifications are given in table (2.12). These results
indicate a decrease with distance of the effect of a connection, but no clear pattern
for the duration of a connection or the time since connection termination. A distance
of 100 kilometers attenuates the effect of the connection by one half; a distance of
200 kilometers, by three quarters.
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Table 2.12: Conditional logit results: at-
tenuation with distance.
(1) (2)
connection
nConn 0.245∗∗∗ 0.504∗
(0.0581) (0.203)
distance
DistConn 0.00693∗ 0.00786∗∗∗
(0.00278) (0.00276)
SinceConn .0288
(0.0304)
DurConn .0246
(0.0166)
Observations 352482 352482
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Dependent variable = 1 if candidate is cho-
sen for the vacancy. Full set of controls in-
cluded.
2.5 Conclusion
This study shows that connections matter, and matter a lot. In some specifications,
a connected bishop’s likelihood of being chosen for a given vacancy is predicted to
exceed by up to 50% the likelihood for the same, counterfactual, unconnected bishop.
This was done using only a small subset of the whole range of connections available
to bishops: I only use connections originating from past geographical proximity. In
reality, there are many more ways in which bishops can establish connections. People
they study with, bishops they work with at the national conference for bishops,
friends of friends, and so on and so forth: this study focuses on the observable tip of
a much more complex iceberg.
As illustrated in the model of section 2, the social implications of this phenomenon
depend on a number of factors. These factors include how accurately the Vatican
can assess the ability of the bishops, and how much personal utility a bishop receives
when someone he has interacted with in the past is promoted to a nearby diocese.
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As these are difficult to quantify without more data, this study cannot conclude as
to whether the phenomenon it measures is beneficial or harmful for the Catholic
Church.
An important question is whether, and to what extent, the results obtained here
for the Catholic Church can be extrapolated to other organizations. Only further
research can answer this accurately; nonetheless, despite all the features that make
it unique, the Catholic Church at its core is no different from most organizations.
The Vatican aims to select the best person for a given diocese, in the same way
as a profit-maximizing organization wishes to promote its most able workers. The
institutions make it possible for social connections to play a role in this; it is also
the case in many firms or organizations in general. Except in rare cases where
performance is perfectly observable, the process of measuring an employee’s ability
is bound to interact with that of creating a social connection. In a sense, the fact
that the estimates obtained here seem rather stable over time and space also lends
some credibility to their external validity, as it proves that the phenomenon studied
is robust to the differences between countries, as well as to the evolutions of the
institutions over much of the twentieth century.
The framework developed here to measure the effect of social connections on ca-
reers can likely be used in other settings. Its appeal is that it requires no information
about actual connections – e.g. no survey asking for the identity of friends. All it
requires is complete career history, and a wide range over time and space. A similar
approach, for example, could potentially be transposed for military data, or govern-
ment agencies (where departments or ministries could play the role of dioceses).
Chapter 3
Intergenerational Transmission of
Human Capital
3.1 Introduction
It is a widely observed fact, in all developed countries, that more educated parents
have more educated children on average. This intergenerational correlation is a
central concern for policies dealing with equality of opportunity. It suggests that
policies aiming at increasing the average educational level of the population may
produce, if indeed there is a causal link, long-lasting effects through spill-overs to the
next generations. Several processes can drive this correlation. For example, parents
enjoying abilities that help achieve higher levels of schooling are also more likely to
have children with the same abilities (ability bias). If this were the only driver of
the observed correlation, increasing education of one cohort would not necessarily
improve the opportunities of the next generation. Several arguments point to a
causal impact of parents education on their children, however. Higher education
often induces higher income, which helps raise children in conditions that are more
favorable for schooling (Maurin, 2002). Education, more generally, can improve some
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parents’ skills that are useful for their children’s education. Children can also conform
to their parents’ model.
The last decade has seen an upsurge in the analysis of this causal relationship.
Most of this empirical literature is a reduced-form analysis (for one exception see
for instance Belzil and Hansen, 2003), and exploits three main sources of exogenous
variations of potential innate abilities of parents (for a comparison of these meth-
ods see Holmlund et al., 2010). First, exploiting differences in education between
monozygotic twins allows researchers to control for genetic endowment (see for a
recent example Behrman and Rosenzweig, 2002). Second, some studies exploit the
difference in genetic endowment between adoptive parents and children to avoid abil-
ity bias (Plug, 2004). Finally, several empirical studies rely on natural experiments
to mimic experimental conditions, by using, for instance, changes in educational pol-
icy as a source of exogenous variations in parental education. Numerous studies, for
instance, have exploited modifications in compulsory schooline laws. Such studies
notably include Oreopoulos and Page (2006) for the United States, Black et al. (2005)
for Norway, and Oreopoulos (2006) for the United Kingdom.
Despite this renewed interest, no consensus emerges. Results differ markedly
across countries. The conclusions also differ on whether intergenerational transmis-
sion of education is more related to mother or father. For instance Black et al. (2005)
find no significant impact of father’s education on their children’s schooling but a
positive impact of mothers’ schooling (mostly on their sons’ schooling). On the con-
trary neither Plug (2004) nor Holmlund et al. (2010) find any significant impact of
mothers’ education on their children’s schooling, while fathers’ education is found to
have a significant impact. The main channel of this possible causal relationship is
also undetermined.
This paper adds the French case to the existing literature. We use the most
recent increase in compulsory education, known as the Berthoin reform, as a natural
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experiment. This reform was voted in France in the late 1950s, and affected all the
individuals born in 1953 or later. It increased the school leaving age from 14 to 16,
bringing the duration of compulsory education from eight to ten years. One speci-
ficity of this reform is that it was carefully prepared, applied to the whole targeted
generation, and thus resulted in remarkable compliance. Another specificity is that
this new schooling age does not correspond to any specific schooling graduation. As
shown by Grenet (2010), this explains why this policy did not lead to any significant
increase in income, contrary to the UK analogue. This provides us with a natu-
ral experiment that introduces an exogenous change in parental education but not
in parental income or career. Therefore, the effect that we set out to identify is the
causal effect of parental education, abstracted from the changes in parental outcomes
that would normally themselves be caused by an increase in education. In fact, at
least three causal pathways can be at play between parental education and child
education: (1) the direct pathway, e.g. parents with more education understand bet-
ter how to teach their children to perform better in the educational system; (2) the
income pathway, e.g. parental education causes more parental income, which allows
the parents to create a familial environment more favourable to child educational
achievement; (3) the social pathway, e.g. parents with more education form social
links, including marriage, with individuals that are also more educated, which causes
better child education. The effect that we are able to identify in this paper is likely
a combination of the first and third of these causal pathways; but the evidence from
Grenet (2010) makes a convincing case that the second is negligible.
In order to estimate the impact of parental education on their children’s schooling
attainment, we use a regression discontinuity design around the time of the enforce-
ment of the compulsory schooling reform. This method has been widely used in
empirical economics since the late 1990s. It exploits a given exogenous threshold de-
termining the “treatment”, which, here, is the fact of having achieved more than 10
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years of education (meaning leaving school after the age of 16, as French compulsory
schooling starts at 6). The Berthoin reform introduced an exogenous discontinuity
in the probability that one leaves school after 16, depending on birth cohort. Parents
born before 1953 face a compulsory school leaving age of 14, while those born later
face a compulsory school leaving age of 16. Using the common terminology in this
empirical literature, it should be noted that the design is “fuzzy” and not sharp. A
significant portion of the cohorts affected by the Berthoin reform already stay at
school after 16. The reform only introduced a discontinuity in the probability of
studying up to 16 years, rather than directly in the years of education of the indi-
viduals. As shown by Hahn et al., 2001, identification can be achieved in this setting
under some assumptions. Estimation relies on a two-step procedure.
We use data from the French Labour Force Survey (also know as Enquête Em-
ploi). The Enquête Emploi is a large household survey providing information on all
individuals aged 15 and over (for uses of this data on related topic see for instance
Grenet, 2010 or Maurin and McNally, 2008). As all household members are inter-
viewed, one can reliably link the education of one parent with schooling attainment
of his (still at home) teenage child. We focus on the educational achievement of
children aged 16 at the date of the survey, more precisely whether a child is in sixth
form of high school (Seconde) at that age. The sample size is large enough to target
precisely the cohort affected by the Berthoin reform and to use the discontinuity it
has created.
Another study, Albouy and Lequien (2009), similarly uses the Berthoin reform
as a natural experiment; however it focuses on the health outcomes of the impacted
individuals, and uses data from the Echantillon Demographique Permanent rather
than the Enquête Emploi. The authors are unable to find a significant effect of an
exogenous change in education on subsequent mortality, in spite of a vast literature
suggesting that such an effect does, in fact, exist. The reason for this may be related
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to the points raised previously, namely that the Berthoin reform did not cause the
changes in income or lifestyle that could themselves have had an impact on health
outcome.
We confirm the observations of previous studies (Albouy and Lequien, 2009 and
Grenet, 2010) that the Berthoin reform had an effective impact on the school leaving
age of the affected cohorts. At the year of the discontinuity, about 10% more parents
leave school at age 16 or above than the year before, jumping from 70% to 80%
of a cohort. This effect is entirely concentrated on the year of the discontinuity;
on both sides of the discontinuity, a stable linear trend towards more education
can be observed. This qualifies the reform as a valid candidate for fuzzy regression
discontinuity design.
Our estimates indicate a positive impact of fathers’ education on their children’s
schooling, but an insignificant effect (the point estimate being negative in some
specifications) of mother education on their children. For father education, the effect
appears to be particularly present on daughter’s education; it is found that complying
to the Berthoin reform raises by as much as 30% to 40% the probability that the
child does not repeat a grade by age 16.
The paper is organized as follows. The next section presents the Berthoin reform
and its impact on education level of the targeted cohorts. The third part presents
the data and some descriptive statistics. Finally, the fourth part presents our iden-
tification strategy and our results.
3.2 The Berthoin reform
As in many other Western countries during that period, compulsory schooling in
France experienced several reforms during the 20th century. Their purpose was
to reduce poverty by providing universal access to basic education, thereby (for
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example) reducing illiteracy.
Following the seminal reform initiated by Jules Ferry in 1882, schooling was
compulsory in France for children aged 6 to 13. In 1936, the Zay reform extended
the leaving age for compulsory schooling to 14 for all children born after 1923. Finally,
the Berthoin reform in 1959 added two years of compulsory schooling. Unlike the
previous reform, this reform was announced and scheduled ahead for implementation,
and the extension of compulsory schooling applies only to “children over six years of
age on January 1, 1959” (for a detailed description see Grenet, 2010). It was thus
effective in 1967, for cohorts born from January 1, 1953 onwards.
The reform had a noticeable impact on school leaving age for both men and
women (see Figure 3.1). The average school leaving age jumped from 17.46 years in
1952 to 17.79 in 1953. The proportion of one cohort that completed at least ten years
of education (i.e. left after age of 16) is 69.1% for the 1952 cohort (last pre-Berthoin
cohort) while it is 79.4% for the 1953 cohort (first post-Berthoin cohort). This effect
clearly came into play for the generation born in 1953, with no detectable evidence
of anticipation nor of progressive implementation in the follow-up years. Figure (3.1)
also highlights a secular trend towards longer education in France in the middle of
the 20th century. Less than 40% of individuals born in 1930 were still at school at
age 16; by 1960, almost everyone was. The effect of the Berthoin reform therefore
needs to be carefully separated from this secular trend.
Figure 3.2 provides another view on the same data, by reporting year-on-year
variations in the proportion of a cohort who left school at age 16 or higher. The
effect of the reform is even more striking than in the previous graph. All the effect
is concentrated in just one year; on either side of 1953, the year on year increase is
remarkably stable. This confirms that the reform was (a) not followed by individuals
from older cohorts in anticipation of the new law and (b) implemented with sufficient
preparation that it achieved all its effect in the first year it was implemented. The
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Figure 3.1: First stage on extended sample, by gender
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effect of the reform appears to have been slightly stronger for females than for males,
possibly because the benefits from non-compliance (e.g. expected income from early
entry in the labour market) were perceived to be lower for females.
The impact is much more noticeable for individuals with lower socio-economic
backgrounds, as indicated in table 3.1. Children of executive or middle-class fathers
were very likely to stay in education after age 16 (up to 97% of children of managers
and intellectuals). The reform had a much greater impact on children of manual
workers. For the former, the reform was irrelevant, while for the latter, the probability
of studying until at least age 16 jumped from 57.5% to 72%.
1952 1953
Farmers 63.8% 73.4%
Self-employed and business owners 77.9% 85.2%
Managers and intellectuals 97.3% 96.7%
Intermediate professions 87.5% 92.4%
Employees 77.2% 86.2%
Workers 57.5% 72.4%
Table 3.1: Percentage of individuals born in 1952 and 1953 who left school at age 16
or late, by socio-professional category of father
It should be emphasized that while the reform did impact the individuals who
did not study beyond age 16, it had no noticeable spillover effect on higher education
levels. Indeed, we can observe that, from the year of the reform onwards, a vast
number of individuals who would have normally left education at age 14, went on
until age 16 instead (see Figure 3.3). By contrast, we do not observe any impact in
the proportion of the affected cohorts that continue education beyond compulsory
school (meaning a school leaving age higher than 17). This is consistent with the
observation that the reform did not result in a noticeable change in the qualification
of these cohorts, as previously stressed by Grenet (2010). A school leaving age of
16 does not correspond to any diploma in the French educational system (see Figure
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Figure 3.2: Year-on-year increase in proportion of cohort leaving school at age >=
16, by gender
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3.4).
As mentioned in our introduction, we feel that this feature is an opportunity
for us to measure intergenerational transmission of human capital in a way that is
not only causal, but also excludes causal pathways that involve parental income or
diploma, contrary to previous studies.
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3.3 Data and Descriptive Analysis
3.3.1 Data
We use data provided by the French Labor Force Survey (Enquête Emploi) from
1982 to 2010. This survey was conducted by the French Office of Statistics (INSEE )
over a large sample of individuals. It provides detailed information on labor force
situation as well as personal information such as education level. All members of
each household are registered, and every member older than 15 is interviewed in
detail. Children can thus be linked to their parents. We could therefore precisely
identify the individuals whose parents were born around 1953, and measure their
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school achievement.
From 1982 to 2002 the Enquête was conducted each year over a sample of about
100,000 households (1/600 of the French population), and conducted quarterly since
2002 over a sample of 55,000 households. Pooling all these surveys, we obtain a
large sample of individuals born around 1953. The sample size is still large even
when restricting to households with teenage children. We thus observe at least 4,000
individuals (male and female) for each cohort born between 1943 and 1963 with a
child age 16 years at the date of survey. The questionnaire of the LFS was modified
twice since 1982, however. As we mostly use fairly basic information, these changes do
not affect most of our variables of interest (cohort of birth, gender, school leaving age,
socio-professional group...) but induce breaks in some variables measuring schooling
levels (see below).
3.3.2 Characteristics of Parents and impact of the reform
Regarding parents, we are able to measure accurately the year of final graduation.
We also have information on location of birth of each respondent, on their occupation,
as well as the occupation and place of birth of their fathers (i.e. the grandfathers of
their children). Table 3.2 present basic statistics for individuals born between 1943
and 1963, irrespective of parental and marital status.
We choose to use as an indicator the fact of having graduated after age 16, which
is the outcome that the reform explicitly targets. First estimates confirm the impact
of the reform observed in the previous section (Figure 3.1). Table (3.3) shows a
very strongly significant effect of the Berthoin reform, even when controlling for a
polynomial of degree 2 in the year of birth of the individual.
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Proportion Freq
Socio-Professional Group
Employees 0.24 111550
Farmer 0.02 10872
Intermediate professions 0.18 84776
Managers and intellectuals 0.10 46628
Retired 0.01 2417
Self-employed and business owners 0.06 27915
Unemployed or military 0.15 69880
Workers 0.23 108152
School Leaving Age
13 or less 0.05 21327
14 0.15 68627
15 0.04 20076
16 0.15 67951
17 0.13 62155
18 0.16 75221
19 or 20 0.13 61742
21 or more 0.18 84564
Level of education
No education or no response 0.02 5050
Primary school 0.15 43980
Secondary school 0.12 34243
High school 0.37 105478
Bac or equivalent 0.12 34887
Bac + 2 0.12 34116
Higher education 0.10 29693
Table 3.2: Descriptive statistics on individuals born between 1943 - 1963
3.3.3 Education of children
Our main indicator of educational attainment for children is to be in sixth form
of high school (seconde) at age 16. This is the case for children who have never
repeated a grade, or who have not repeated more grades than they have skipped
grades. Children who both skipped and repeated a grade by age 16 are a small
minority, hence our measure can safely be interpreted as indicating children with no
history of grade repetition. This choice was driven by several considerations.
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Table 3.3: First stage results.
Males Females
(Intercept) 0.70088 (0.00348) *** 0.71762 (0.00323) ***
Post-reform 0.07701 (0.00496) *** 0.09719 (0.00458) ***
(Year of birth)1 0.01761 (0.00078) *** 0.01533 (0.00072) ***
(Year of birth)2 0.00071 (0.00014) *** 0.00014 (0.00013)
Number of observations 123083 134883
F-test for excluded instrument 240.592 450.562
Effect of the reform on the affected cohort’s education achievement. The dependent variable
is an indicator that the individual was at school until age 16 or more. The variable of interest
is Post-reform, indicating whether the individual was born in 1953 or later and was therefore
affected by the Berthoin reform. The sample is all individuals born within 5 years of the
reform and surveyed in the LFS (Enquete Emploi) before 2002.
Significance key: *** = .1%, ** = 1%, * = 5%, . = 10%.
First, being in high school is of primary importance for the considered cohorts in
terms of access to jobs and future earnings. It notably conditions the graduation of
high school diploma (baccalauréat), meaning the first level of diploma that matters
in terms of labour market prospects. The first part of French high school, the college,
also coincides with the award of a diploma, the BEPC or brevet , but it is achieved
by almost 100% of a cohort and considered as useless in terms of labour market
prospects as well as the entrance to senior high school.
Second, several studies indicate that grade-retention is correlated with lower fu-
ture educational achievement and ultimately earnings (see for instance Brodaty et al.,
2008 and Manacorda, 2010). However, this could not be accurately measured before
the sixth-form of high school. In France, grade retention is made with the agreement
of pupils’ parents until that level of schooling. This could create discrepancies for
students according to their social origin for instance. By contrast, entrance in senior
high school requires the sole agreement of teachers at the end of the junior high
school.
Third, we prefer to focus on children sufficiently young to still live at their parents’
house, in order to be sure that they are simultaneously interviewed in the survey.
This disqualifies for instance the use as an indicator the fact of obtaining a high-
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school diploma : the normal age for getting this diploma is 18, an age at which a
number of youths do live on their own. We thus avoid the risk of endogenous attrition
by focusing on younger individuals.
Finally, this variable appears less sensitive to the changes occurred in the LFS.
Figure 3.5 presents the proportion of 16-year-old children in time in Seconde. It
clearly presents an upward trend over the period. We do observe a dip in 1990, which
could be related to a change in the questionnaire of the LFS that year. By contrast,
the proportion of 16-year-old children with brevet, on the same graph, show major
discontinuity in 1990 and 2002 (years at which the LFS underwent methodology
changes); it is, besides, not available before 1990. On that same graph, we also
report, on a third time-series, individuals who are in seconde and have been awarded
the brevet.
For those reasons, our preferred measure of children educational achievement is
defined as being in seconde (or a higher grade) by age 16; however we will report some
results for the obtention of the brevet by that same age, for the sake of robustness.
Table 3.4 reports results obtained by linear regression of child education (defined
as being in seconde at age 16) on parental education and parental year of birth. It
indicates that on average and controlling for parental year of birth as well as survey
year, children of a parent who stayed in school until at least age 16 are about 25%
more likely to be in seconde by age 16.
3.4 Methodology and Results
3.4.1 Identification strategy : RDD estimation
Our identification strategy exploits the discontinuity introduced by the Berthoin
reform in the completed schooling of cohorts born around 1953. More precisely, we
use a Regression on Discontinuity Design, which became standard in the literature
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Figure 3.5: Proportion of 16 year old in Seconde or with Brevet, by year of survey
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Table 3.4: OLS results.
Father Father Mother Mother
(Intercept) 0.11 0.20 0.081 0.15
(0.022) *** (0.023) *** (0.018) *** (0.019) ***
Parent SLA ≥ 16 0.25 0.26 0.26 0.28
(0.0085) *** (0.0089) *** (0.0080) *** (0.0083) ***
(Parent’s year of birth)1 -0.012 -0.012 -0.015 -0.016
(0.00091) *** (0.00096) *** (0.00087) *** (0.00091) ***
(Parent’s year of birth)2 0 -0.00014 0.00014 .00005
(0.00013) (0.00014) (0.00012) (0.00013)
(Survey year)1 .0008 0.0045 -0.00018 0.00580
(0.0026) (0.0027) . (0.0023) (0.0024) *
(Survey year)2 0.00039 0.00023 0.00046 0.00031
(.00008) *** (.00008) ** (.00008) *** (.00008) ***
Number of observations 16439 15459 19063 18260
Child gender Son Daughter Son Daughter
OLS regression relating parental schooling and child education. The dependent variable
is an indicator that the child was in seconde or higher at age 16. The variable of interest
is Parent SLA ≥ 16, indicating whether the parent left school at age 16 or higher. The
sample is all individuals born within 10 years of the reform and surveyed in the LFS
(Enquete Emploi) before 2002.
Significance key: *** = .1%, ** = 1%, * = 5%, . = 10%.
Gender Seconde Brevet
Female 48% 56%
Male 36% 45%
Table 3.5: Education at age 16 by child gender
on causal effects and treatment effects since (at least) the late 90s (see Imbens and
Lemieux, 2008 for a clear and precise presentation of this method). The basic setting
of this design is a context where the endogenous variable T partly depends on the
value of another continuous value, the selection variable. The key feature of regression
discontinuity designs is that this dependency is discontinuous for a known cutoff
value of this selection variable. As formally proven by Hahn et al. (2001), under
some identification assumptions one can consistently estimate the causal impact of
the treatment on the outcome of interest.
In our case, we are interested in the effect of having completed at least ten years
of schooling on the schooling attainments of a person’s children. As mentioned in
the last section, completed schooling is an increasing function of the cohort of birth,
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as it has increased all over the century, and “jumped” for cohorts born in 1953 and
after (due to the Berthoin reform). Note also that more than half of the people born
before 1953 already completed more than 10 years of schooling, while a number of
individuals born later still completed less than mandatory schooling. We therefore
face a so-called “fuzzy design”. Several assumptions are required for identification of
a causal impact.
Let us denote by S the year of birth (our selection variable), and S the value of
the threshold (1953). We follow the potential outcomes framework, and denote, for
an individual i, by Yi0, the potential value of completed schooling if he had not been
affected by the Berthoin reform (i.e. birth before 1953); and by Yi1, the potential
value if he had been affected (i.e. birth after 1953). As stated by Hahn et al. (2001),
the causal impact can be locally identified provided a local continuity assumption
(meaning that no other variable discontinuously impacts the outcome at the cut-
off point) and a local monotonicity assumption (similar to Angrist et al., 1996) are
satisfied1. More specifically, this latter assumption states that the probability of
having performed at least ten years of schooling increases due to the reform for
all individuals. This rules out the existence of “defiers” (in the AIR terminology),
individuals that would have performed more than ten years of schooling when it was
not mandatory and less instead. This seems a reasonably mild assumption in our
case.
Under these assumptions, a consistent estimator for the causal impact δ of having
parents who completed ten years of schooling on one child’s schooling attainment is
given by:
δ =
limS↘S E(Y |S)− limS↗S E(Y |S)
limS↘S E(T |S)− limS↗S E(T |S) (3.1)
1An alternative would be a somewhat stronger local independence assumption, see again Hahn
et al. (2001).
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In practice (see Imbens and Lemieux, 2008), semi-parametric estimation in an
RDD can be simply performed by local linear regression. More precisely, a consistent
estimate of the numerator limS↘S E(Y |S)− limS↗S E(Y |S) is provided by:
min
(δ,b1,...,bK)
∑
i
1(S+h>Si>S−h)(Yi − a− δ1(Si>S) − b1(Si − S)
− b′1(Si − S)1(Si>S) − . . .)2
where h is the size of the bandwidth and K the degree of polynomial extension. Simi-
lar estimate could be obtained for the denominator limS↘S E(T |S)−limS↗S E(T |S).
Two remarks are in order. First, one should emphasize that the obtained estima-
tor is a LATE (Local Average Treatment Effect). As such, it measures the average
impact of parents’ schooling for individuals who comply to schooling obligation: they
perform eight years of schooling if born before 1953, and ten if born after. It is also
restricted to children whose parents are born around 1953.
Second, under some technical choices, an estimate for 3.1 obtained by 2SLS
method, using the indicator 1(Si>S) as the excluded instrument, would be numer-
ically identical to an estimate based on separate estimates of the denominator and
numerator (see Imbens and Lemieux, 2008)2.
3.4.2 Technical choices
We choose to estimate limS↘S E(T |S) − limS↗S E(T |S) (which corresponds to the
“first stage” in an IV procedure) on all the individuals who were born close to 1953
(one to ten years, depending on specifications), i.e. the cohorts impacted by the
reform. We thus use a much larger sample than the one we can use for estimating
2More specifically, using the same bandwidth size and polynomial extension degrees for both
denominator and numerator the estimator could be simply obtained by a 2SLS estimation on the
subsample of the neighborhood around the cut-off value.
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the numerator limS↘S E(Y |S) − limS↗S E(Y |S) (the “second-stage”), as we do not
restrict the sample to individuals who went on to have children. This is not an
entirely innocuous procedure, as those individuals may differ slightly from the 2nd
stage population – i.e. the individuals who are surveyed when they have a 16-year-
old child in the household. However, we feel that the benefits of this approach, in
terms of the precision of the first stage we are thus able to estimate, far outweigh
any possible bias that could arise, for example, if future parents were differently
affected by the reform than the average individual. Note, also, that most individuals
in this extended sample will be a parent; whether we can use these individuals in the
second stage depends on whether we observe the household when a child is 16, which
is random – albeit arguably increasing in the number or children in the household.
We first choose to use a non parametric estimator with a small bandwidth (one
to three years after the introduction of the Berthoin reform). This corresponds to a
Wald estimator. As the sample size is small, we also present the estimates using a
larger bandwidth, and controlling for the potential impact of cohort on schooling by
polynomial function. We obtain inference by bootstrap.
3.4.3 Two-stage estimation
The tables below describes results that depart slightly from the discontinuity of 1953;
rather, they rely on a polynomial parameterization, both of the relationship between
parental education and parental year of birth, and of that of children educational
achievement and parental year of birth. In our baseline, preferred specification, we
allow for a polynomial of degree two to describe these relationships within a window
of 10 years on each side of the reform – that is, parents born between 1943 and 1963.
While we also report results using polynomials of degree 1 and 3, we feel that degree
1 is too low to capture the possible concavity of the relationships, while degree 3 may
be asking too much of the data given the relatively small size of the window.
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Fathers
In many of the specifications relative to paternal education, we find a large and
significant effect of parental education on a child’s early educational achievement.
More precisely, in our preferred specification (column (1) in Table (3.6)), we find that
the fact that a father who finished school after age 16, rather than earlier, improves
by about 25% the likelihood for his offspring to have reached seconde by age 16.
Similar results are obtained with our other child education variables in columns (4)
and (5).
Columns (6) and (7) allow the functional form around the discontinuity to depart
from a polynomial of degree 2. (6) and (7) use, respectively, polynomials of degree 1
and 3. While the results in (6) are remarkably similar to the baseline, the measured
effect is somewhat weakened in column (7); the p-value for the significance test of
the effect, nonetheless, is still relatively low, at about 11%. The magnitude of the
point estimate is mostly unchanged in both specifications varying between 25% and
30%.
Column (8) uses a continuous dependent variable (parental school leaving age)
rather than the indicator used in the other columns. The estimation is too imprecise
for the result to be relied on; nonetheless the point estimate is, again, in the same
region as the other specifications. The same applies to column (9), in which we
reduce (at the expense of sample size) the size of the window, to consider only 5
years on either side of 1953.
Mothers
Table (3.7) reports the same specifications for the effect of maternal education.
Though the precision of our estimates does not allow us to rule out the possibil-
ity of a moderate effect, it appears that maternal education has a smaller causal
effect on child early education outcomes than paternal education does. In fact, one
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specification, in column (4), indicates a significantly negative effect; however, it relies
on the measurement of child educational achievement (obtention of “Brevet” by age
16) which we trust the least (see dips in the time series, as seen in figure (3.5)).
3.4.4 Wald estimation
We estimate in this section the causal effect of interest using the Wald estimator,
in direct proximity to the 1953 break. This estimator relies very explicitly on the
discontinuity introduced by the reform; ideally we would compare individuals born
just before 1st January 1953, to individuals born just after. Indeed, as we have
seen, the reform was introduced at a time when there was a very clear trend towards
longer education; therefore, taking a window of even a few years around 1953 would
potentially be comparing individuals facing a different social and education environ-
ment (even if the reform had never happened). However, the narrower our window
around 1953 is, and the fewer individuals we have in our sample; therefore we need
our window not to be too narrow. We choose to make its radius vary between one
and three years.
Tables (3.8) and (3.9) present results for these different window sizes, and respec-
tively for fathers and mothers. The Wald estimates are reported separately for boys
and for girls, as well as a third specification that does not distinguish child gender.
The sample size for these estimations varies between 3555 children (father specifica-
tion with 1-year window) and 12317 (mother specification with 3-year window).
We again find evidence of a significant, possibly large effect of father education on
child educational outcome. In the one-year window specification, our point estimate
is particularly large, though with very wide confidence bounds, resulting from the
small sample side. The two- and three-year window specification point to a smaller,
yet still considerable effect. Going to school for two additional years as a result of
the reform is indeed estimated to increase by about 20% (though it varies across
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Table 3.6: Second stage results – Fathers.
Specification (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
(Intercept) 0.09 0.314 0.24 0.196 0 0.093 0.043 -3.65 0.134
(0.093) (0.123) * (0.139) . (0.097) * (0.091) (0.092) (0.158) (5.48) (0.145)
ˆeduparent 0.243 0.111 0.38 0.164 0.32 0.242 0.306 0.221 0.195
(0.123) * (0.164) (0.185) * (0.129) (0.121) ** (0.123) * (0.209) (0.308) (0.194)
sex 0.125 0.117 0.118 0.125 0.125 0.125 0.122
(0.006) *** (0.006) *** (0.005) *** (0.006) *** (0.006) *** (0.006) *** (0.007) ***
(Year of birth)1 -0.003 0 -0.006 -0.001 -0.007 -0.003 -0.005 -0.018 -0.001
(0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) * (0.003) (0.006) (0.028) (0.006)
(Year of birth)2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.001 0
(0) (0) (0) (0) * (0) (0) (0.001) (0)
(Year of birth)3 0
(0)
Number of observations 30314 15614 14700 24932 30314 30314 30314 30314 18137
Dependent Variable Seconde Seconde Seconde Brevet Both Seconde Seconde Seconde Seconde
Window (years) +/- 10 +/- 10 +/- 10 +/- 10 +/- 10 +/- 10 +/- 10 +/- 10 +/- 5
Child gender Both Boy Girl Both Both Both Both Both Both
Endogenous variable SLA >= 16 SLA >= 16 SLA >= 16 SLA >= 16 SLA >= 16 SLA >= 16 SLA >= 16 SLA SLA >= 16
Second stage
Significance key: *** = .1%, ** = 1%, * = 5%, . = 10%.
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Table 3.7: Second stage results – Mothers.
Specification (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
(Intercept) 0.229 0.359 0.467 0.484 0.197 0.261 0.288 -0.306 0.264
(0.075) ** (0.101) *** (0.109) *** (0.084) *** (0.074) ** (0.072) *** (0.107) ** (1.71) (0.112) *
ˆeduparent 0.035 0.019 0.046 -0.232 0.039 0.003 -0.042 0.032 -0.024
(0.096) (0.131) (0.141) (0.108) * (0.096) (0.094) (0.138) (0.098) (0.143)
sex 0.121 0.117 0.115 0.122 0.122 0.121 0.127
(0.005) *** (0.006) *** (0.005) *** (0.005) *** (0.005) *** (0.006) *** (0.007) ***
(Year of birth)1 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.006 -0.002 0.001 0.004 -0.002 0.003
(0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) * (0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.01) (0.004)
(Year of birth)2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
(0) ** (0) ** (0) (0) . (0) * (0) * (0) * (0)
(Year of birth)3 0
(0)
Number of observations 35402 18105 17297 27392 35402 35402 35402 35402 21211
Dependent Variable Seconde Seconde Seconde Brevet Both Seconde Seconde Seconde Seconde
Window (years) +/- 10 +/- 10 +/- 10 +/- 10 +/- 10 +/- 10 +/- 10 +/- 10 +/- 5
Child gender Both Boy Girl Both Both Both Both Both Both
Endogenous variable SLA >= 16 SLA >= 16 SLA >= 16 SLA >= 16 SLA >= 16 SLA >= 16 SLA >= 16 SLA SLA >= 16
Second stage
Significance key: *** = .1%, ** = 1%, * = 5%, . = 10%.
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Table 3.8: Wald estimation results (fathers)
Child gender Boy Girl Any
1 year radius 0.231 (0.173) 0.413 (0.239) . 0.362 (0.151) *
2 year radius -0.026 (0.195) 0.408 (0.166) * 0.179 (0.12)
3 year ratius 0.109 (0.095) 0.228 (0.076) ** 0.192 (0.084) *
Wald estimator.
Significance key: *** = .1%, ** = 1%, * = 5%, . = 10%.
Table 3.9: Wald estimation results (mothers)
Child gender Boy Girl Any
1 year radius -0.11 (0.173) -0.237 (0.21) -0.126 (0.111)
2 year radius -0.052 (0.123) -0.086 (0.107) -0.057 (0.093)
3 year ratius 0.019 (0.057) 0.025 (0.078) 0.024 (0.066)
Wald estimator.
Significance key: *** = .1%, ** = 1%, * = 5%, . = 10%.
child gender and window specifications) the probability for a man’s children to be in
Seconde by age 16. The effect seems particularly strong for girls.
For mothers, we find no evidence of any effect. If anything, point estimates
are slightly negative for 1- and 2-year windows, but remain far from conventional
significance levels.
3.5 Conclusion
We find evidence that paternal education has a strong causal effect on the education
of children, considerably affecting the likelihood of grade repetition by age 16. In-
terestingly, as previous studies have convincingly made the point that the Berthoin
reform had a strong effect on years of schooling, yet hardly any on diploma or future
earnings, the causal effect that we identify is truly attributable directly to education
rather than, for example, to byproducts of an increased education, such as career
success.
That we only found a significant effect for fathers, and none for mothers, is diffi-
cult to explain. Nonetheless, while maternal education is not found to significantly
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affect the education of the child, neither is its effect found to be significantly different
from that of paternal education. Therefore, it would likely be unwise to attempt to
explain why paternal education could thus affect the child’s education in a different
way from maternal education.
These results imply that policies such as the Berthoin reform are likely to be
more successful in the very long run than early evaluations (based on early career
or income) are likely to estimate. Indeed, our study uses recent data (most of our
sample was surveyed between 1990 and 2010) to document the effects of a reform
that occurred more than forty years ago.
The channels through which this causal effect expresses itself are beyond the scope
of this study, but may include such factors as a greater understanding of the role of the
educational system and of the type of work that is expected from successful pupils,
both of which may be passed on to the child regardless of the parent’s diplomas or
income. A lot of recent evidence suggests that parental attitudes to their offspring’s
education and homework, as well as their degree of involvement, may have vast effects
on educational outcomes (see, for example, Avvisati et al., 2010).
Another channel could be through homogamy, that is, the tendency for individu-
als to match with partners with similar backgrounds and education. As we treat the
effect of parental education completely separately from the spouses, we cannot rule
out this causal channel.
Chapter 4
Employer learning in presence of
general and match-specific human
capital
4.1 Introduction
Information imperfections play a central role in the labour market. In particular, they
contribute to matching frictions of at least two types. First, unemployed workers and
vacant jobs coexist at any point in time; yet in most cases, unemployed workers are
capable of contributing a non-negative production value. Second, observed matches
of workers to firms are often not optimal, and a reallocation of workers to firm
may increase aggregate output. One interpretation is that productivity is at least
partially match-specific and that there is some uncertainty about this match-specific
productivity - uncertainty which is, at best, costly to resolve.
This paper explores the assumption that the productivity of a worker in a given
match is not entirely specific to this match. In other words, a certain amount of
this productivity would be transfered to the new match, should the worker decide
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(or be led to) change jobs. I think of this situation as one where productivity has
both a general (transferable) and a specific (non-transferable) component. Total
productivity on a job is, then, assumed to be an increasing function of each of these
two components.
The relative importance of general productivity and match-specific productiv-
ity is likely to vary across sectors of the labour market. If the focus is on careers
and mobility between relatively substitutable jobs, e.g. lecturer in economics in
different institutions, general productivity will be relevant to the skills that are nec-
essary for this type of job in any university (pedagogy, insight, motivation). Spe-
cific productivity will likely be narrower, and include for example peer-effects from
department-specific collegues. In this situation, it seems that the general component
for productivity will amount to most of the productivity in the match1. In a way,
this “general” productivity is already specific to this segment of the labour market.
However, one can be interested in mobility between occupations requiring skills
that overlap less evidently. In that case, the transferable part of human capital is ex-
pected to amount to a relatively lower share of the total productivity. One can think
of many potential sources of variations of productivity across matches. Different
workers may react differently to pressure at work; some other worker characteristics,
e.g. interpersonal skills, are valued differently across jobs. Worker intrisic motivation
is also likely to vary across jobs and affect productivity.
The fundamental assumption made in this paper is that the general productivity
of the worker is unknown ex ante, as well as his job specific productivity in any job
available to him. Once on a job, whilst the worker’s total productivity is perfectly
observed by all the agents in the economy, it is not known how this productivity is
split between its general and specific components. In other words, there is uncertainty
1In other words, and to be consistent with the framework developed later, the variance of the
specific component is small compared to that of the general component.
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on the share of productivity which can be transfered to the next job, and that which
is specific to the current job. This assumption implies that the only way for the
economy to obtain information on a worker’s general productivity is to observe him
experiment enough jobs to extract this information with sufficient clarity.
Much of the literature on employer learning on the labour market focuses on
information on match-specific productivity. The seminal paper is Jovanovic (1979).
In this paper, the worker and his firm learn continuously about the quality of the
current match until the match is broken. Since all human capital is match-specific
and the worker lives forever, the value of quitting does not depend on history, and it
is shown that the decision to quit depends only on whether the current productivity is
above or below a reservation productivity, which itself is a function only of tenure on
the current job. More recent papers featuring uncertainty on job-specific productivity
include, for example, Moscarini (2005) and Felli and Harris (1996). In this paper, by
contrast, the turnover history of the worker affects his value of quitting by updating
the public information on his general human productivity.
Another branch of the learning literature focuses on learning about general pro-
ductivity. In a working paper, Eeckhout (2006) focuses explicitly on the case where
all the human capital is general, that is, the worker is expected to have the same
productivity in all jobs. Other papers, such as Farber and Gibbons (1996) or Altonji
and Pierret (2001), implicitly study learning about general productivity, in that the
worker is endowed with a certain unobserved innate ability, which affects his produc-
tivity on all matches. In the case where the worker has better information about his
ability than prospective employers, studying uncertainty on general human capital
allows for interesting discussions on the value for the worker of signalling his general
human capital through education, á la Spence (1973). That is the focus of both
Farber and Gibbons (1996) and Altonji and Pierret (2001), whereas Eeckhout (2006)
concentrates on mobility and competition amongst employers.
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In some cases, assuming that all human capital is transferable seems to be a
better approximation of reality than the assumption that it is entirely match-specific
(e.g., example of academics); the truth, as often, is likely to lie between these two
extremes, which is the motivation of this paper2.
While this study aims to focus on employer learning about the productivity of the
worker (assumed to be constant over time), accumulation of human capital on the
job (learning-by-doing) is another important phenomenon that has been the object of
much interest in recent years. These two effects are not mutually exclusive3, although
for the sake of tractability most analyses tend to focus on either one. An interesting
exception is Nagypál (2006), which endeavours to distinguish and measure the two
effects. Nagypál builds and estimates a model where (specific) learning-by-doing
and learning about match quality coexist. Her estimates suggest that the relative
strength of these two effects varies with tenure. Learning-by-doing may be present
during the first few months of employment, but the dominating, longer-lasting effect
seems to be learning about match quality. Moreover, Nagypál’s estimates imply that
learning about match quality leads to an increase in output of roughly 30% over a ten
years horizon. This is a selection effect: matches that are revealed to be unproductive
are discontinued earlier, and only the most productive remain.
My assumption that the total productivity of a worker on a match is immediately
observable by all agents may seem strong, as it implies an infinite speed of learning
about match quality. However, one way to rationalize this is to interpret each period
as long enough for this assumption to be justified. For example (in the three-period
version of the model) if the first period is to be interpreted as the entry of the
2This feature (coexistence of general and specific human capital) comes at the cost of strong
assumptions on other respects, e.g. that workers themselves do not know their general human
capital. Tractability of the results is also limited; in fact, only the three-period model yields closed-
form solutions. For the extension of the model to an infinite number of periods, the inquiry is aided
by computer simulations.
3In fact, some authors consider employer learning to be itself a form of human capital accumu-
lation; see, for example, Felli and Harris (2004).
CHAPTER 4. EMPLOYER LEARNING 80
young worker on the labour market, and the third period as immediately followed
by retirement, then each period can actually be seen as summarizing more than ten
years, which is more than enough to learn perfectly about match quality4. According
to Lange (2007), after three years, the employer’s initial expectation errors about
match-quality have declined already by 50%. One contribution of this paper is to
raise the point that perfect knowledge about the worker’s productivity on a given
match does not say anything about how much of this productivity is transferable to
other potential matches, leading (among others) to potential ineffiencies.
This paper explores some implications of learning on both general and specific
human capital, first in a three-period model and then in an infinite-period model.
In the three-period case, I first assume that the worker is always paid exactly his
productivity. In this case, the worker turnover decisions are efficient, as they optimize
his expected productivity, and thus his incentives are aligned with those of a social
planner with the same (limited) information set. I derive the turnover decision of the
worker in this context, and show that he will be slightly more prone to change job
after the first period if his initial information on general productivity is imprecise.
I then assume that the firms (all assumed to observe the job history of the worker)
make simultaneous wage offers at each period. Although his rewards are modified,
the worker’s turnover behaviour in each period is unaltered compared to the previous
case. Competition between potential new employers guarantees that the outside
wage paid to the worker, if he moves, equals his expected productivity. The current
employer can try to extract rent from the worker’s match-specific productivity, as
long as it can afford to pay at least the outside wage.
The case of an infinite number of periods is also explored. Closed form solutions
are not tractable, but the analysis lends itself to computer simulations, the results
4For the same reason (and for simplicity), it is assumed here that learning-by-doing is negligible;
hence it is not included it in the model. This is consistent with Nagypál’s results.
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of which I provide. It is found that many of the insights from the three-period
case carry over; in particular, wage inequalities arise across workers that are ex ante
identical. Depending on specifications, wage dispersion can widen with age, but at a
decreasing pace, which matches empirical observations. It is also found that the rate
of mobility decreases over time. Finally, the model predicts that, at any given time
(past the first few periods), the correlation between workers’ general human capital
and match-specific human capital is negative. This is mainly driven by the fact that
low ability workers move sufficiently often during early periods to find a match that
is comparatively good. By contrast, high-ability workers tend to settle early for jobs
that are not as good for them as they believe; they dare not move, for fear of getting
a worse match.
4.2 The three-period model
4.2.1 Informational structure and worker mobility
I consider one worker facing an infinity of job vacancies, issued by separate firms
competing on the market for labour, indexed by i ∈ {1, ...,+∞}. The ex ante
characteristics of job vacancies are identical. The worker is endowed with a gen-
eral productivity, denoted as g, and match-specific productivities corresponding to
each of the job vacancies, denoted as si. These quantities are unobserved, but all
agents (worker and firms) have the same beliefs about them. There is no information
asymmetry.
Ex ante, g is believed to follow a normal distribution with mean mg and precision
hg
5. Similarly, for all i, si is normally distributed with mean 0 and precision hs
6. g
and all the si are believed to be independent from each other.
5Following the convenient convention in Bayesian work, I call “precision” the inverse of the
variance
6Throughout the paper, I will use the notation h for precisions, and σ2 for variances.
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The prior belief on g can be interpreted as deriving from all the signals available
about g before the worker enters his first job - i.e., signals resulting from the education
of the worker, interview skills, etc.
At the beginning of each period, the worker is free to chose to work in any of the
jobs, but cannot go back to a job he left in the past. Since all the jobs are equivalent
ex ante, this means that in fact, his choice is between staying on the current match,
or changing job. The production xi of the period is perfectly observed, and is known
to satisfy xi = g + si. That is, total productivity is the sum of general productivity
and match-specific productivity.
I assume, for now, that the wage paid to the worker is equal to his total pro-
ductivity. This ignores the fact that profit-maximizing firms will try to retain at
least part of the rent, especially if the match-specific (non transferable) component
is believed to be high. I will depart from this benchmark later, when I allow for
strategic wage-setting.
Studying the turnover behaviour of a worker being paid his full productivity is a
way to find the efficient turnover, maximizing social surplus, of a more general model
where the rent is somehow shared between the firm and the worker. The worker, in
this benchmark, internalizes all the effect of his turnover. He gets paid his expected
total productivity at the beginning of each period 7.
Upon changing jobs, a new si is drawn, and xi, its sum with g, is perfectly
observed. This allows the worker and the firms to update their belief on si and
(more crucially maybe) on g.
The worker’s objective is to maximize his intertemporal utility, which is assumed
7Assuming, as I do, that all agents are risk neutral, this last assumption is equivalent to the
alternative where the worker is paid at the end of the period, once production has been observed - or
even to an intermediate possibility (not developed here) where productivity within a match is learnt
progressively during each period, and wages follow the evolution of beliefs on total productivity.
However for this last context to be consistent with the other assumptions about learning between
periods, it still needs to be the case that total productivity is perfectly known by the time one
period ends.
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to be the sum of his discounted wages. The interest rate is denoted as r.
The worker lives only for three periods. He can change jobs after the first and
second periods.
I henceforth use subscripts to denote the period. For all t in {1, 2, 3}, the worker’s
productivity (perfectly observed) is denoted as xt and the two components of his
productivity are believed to be normally distributed with means µgt and µ
s
t and
precision ht
8.
Theorem 4.2.1 If the economy’s belief on g is normally distributed with mean µgt
and precision ht and the worker starts job j where his productivity is revealed to be
x, then the economy’s updated belief on g is normally distributed with mean
µ
g
t ht+xhs
ht+hs
and precision hs + ht.
Proof It is known that if x is normally distributed with known precision h but
unknown mean µ, and the prior for µ is itself normally distributed with mean µ0 and
precision h0, then the posterior for µ upon observing x is normally distributed with
mean µ0h0+hx
h0+h
and precision h0 + h.
When the worker starts a new job where his productivity (distributed normally
with mean g and precision hs) is revealed to be x, the posterior distribution for g
therefore becomes
µ
g
t ht+xhs
ht+hs
with precision hs + ht. 
This theorem, applied as many times as necessary, gives us the distribution of
the economy’s belief once past matches are observed and accounted for. A corollary
is:
Corollary 4.2.2 The economy’s belief on g after n matches have been experienced
is normally distributed with precision Hn = hg + nhs, or equivalently variance Sn =
1
H(n) .
8Since xt = µ
g
t + µ
s
t and xt is observed, it needs indeed be the case that beliefs on µ
g
t and µ
s
t
have the same variance.
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Behaviour in the second period
The worker gets payoff x2 in the second period and decides whether to change jobs
or not for his third period. He will change jobs if his expected payoff from doing so is
greater than x2, which he can get for sure by not breaking the current match. That
is, the worker moves if µg2 > x2, or 0 > µ
s
2. An expression for µ
s
2 is
(x2−µg1)σ2s
σ2s+S1
2 .
The present discounted value of the payoff in the second period is therefore a
function of x2 which I shall denote as Π2(x2):
Π2(x2) = x2 +
1
1 + r
Max
(
x2,
µ
g
1σ
2
s + x2S1
2
σ2s + S1
2
)
= x2
(
1 +
1
1 + r
)
+
1
1 + r
Max
(
0,
(µg1 − x2)σ2s
σ2s + S1
2
)
(4.1)
Behaviour in the first period
In the first period, the worker gets payoff x1 and decides whether to change jobs
or not. This decision depends on how his expected discounted payoffs compare in
both cases. If he does not change jobs, he receives payoff (1 + 11+r +
1
(1+r)2
)x1
9. If
he changes jobs, he receives payoff x1 +
1
1+rE1 (Π2(x2)), where E1 denotes expected
value given the information available (i.e. beliefs held) at the end of period 1.
9It is easy to show that if the worker does not move today, he will not move tomorrow either. This
is because the expected reward for moving is larger after period 1 than after period 2. Indeed, in the
case of mobility after period 2, the expected return from moving is simply the difference between
the current productivity and the expected productivity on the new match. On the contrary, in the
case of mobility after period 1, if the new match is a good match, it can be enjoyed for two periods;
if it is a bad match, it is possible to move again in period three. That is, the possibility of moving
again after period 2 makes moving after period 1 more appealing.
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Theorem 4.2.3 The worker decides to change jobs in the first period if and only if
µs1 ≤
1
2 + r
1√
2pi
σ2s√
σ2s + S1
2
(4.2)
or equivalently
x1 −mg ≤ 1
2 + r
1√
2pi
σ2s + σ
2
g√
σ2s + S1
2
(4.3)
Proof Given that E1(x2) = µ
g
1 and that µ
g
1 − x2 is believed to be normally dis-
tributed with mean 0 and variance S1
2 + σ2s , it can be proved
10 that E1 (Π2(x2)) =(
1 + 11+r
)
µ
g
1+
1
1+r
1√
2pi
σ2s√
σ2s+S1
2
. Therefore, the worker’s expected payoff if he moves
is believed to be x1 +
1
1+r
((
1 + 11+r
)
µ
g
1 +
1
1+r
1√
2pi
σ2s√
σ2s+S1
2
)
.
Comparing this expected return with the return of staying with the current em-
ployer straightforwardly yields the theorem. 
The right-hand side in 4.3 can be shown to be always increasing in σ2g . Its
variations with respect to σ2s are non-monotonic. It decreases until σ
2
s ≤ (
√
3−1)σ2g ,
and increases ever after.
In other words, ceteris paribus (in particular, for a given x1 higher than mg
11), I
learn three things about the worker’s mobility given his first draw x1. (1) The worker
tends to move more the higher the initial uncertainty on his general productivity is.
(2) If the draws of match-specific productivity are very precise, then reducing this
precision tends to make the worker move less. This second effect is more pronounced
when there is high initial uncertainty on general productivity. And (3), if the draws
of match-specific productivity are rather imprecise, then reducing this precision tends
to make the worker move more.
10Using the property that, if z is a standard normal, E(z|z > 0) = 2√
2Π
, which implies
E(Max(0, z)) = 1√
2Π
.
11If x1 < mg the worker unambiguously moves, as his µ
1
g is greater than x1 (being a weighted
average of x1 and mg), which means that he believes his s1 to be negative.
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A few comments may be in order regarding each of these effects. (1) is simply a
consequence of the fact that if there is high initial uncertainty on general productivity,
then the first match has a large influence on the way the economy’s belief is updated.
Remember that I restrict this discussion to the case where x1 is larger thanmg, which
means that the belief on general productivity is updated upwards. At the limit, when
σ2g goes to infinity, the new belief approaches x1, and then the worker will want to
move no matter how x1 compares to mg. (2) works through a similar mechanism. If
x1 ≥ mg, and σ2g is quite high compared to the initial σ2s , then when σ2s increases, the
updated belief on general productivity (µg1) shifts away from x1 and towards mg, and
thus decreases. Then the current match is perceived as a better match than before
the σ2s increase, and the worker’s willingness to move decreases. This is a rather
small effect, but it can dominate over (3) in certain situations. The intuition behind
(3) is as follows: if x1 ≥ mg, and σ2g is relatively low compared to the initial σ2s ,
then when σ2s increases, the most important effect is that the distribution of future
draws becomes more variable. This means that exceptionally high draws become
more common. (As do exceptionally low draws, of course, but at this point the
worker knows that there will be one more opportunity to move in the future - so a
low draw will only be imposed on the worker for one period, whereas a high draw
will be enjoyed twice.) Therefore when σ2s increases, the worker’s incentives to move
go up.
The previous discussion was all conditional on the first draw x1. It is quite
straightforward to show that prior to this first draw, the probability of the worker
moving after the first period is Φ
(
1
2+r
1√
2pi
σ2s+σ
2
g
σs
√
σ2s+2σ
2
g
)
, which is everywhere decreas-
ing in σ2s and increasing in σ
2
g . That is, the worker’s unconditional probability of
moving increases when his initial information on general human capital becomes more
imprecise, or when the signals he receives on each new job become more precise - ie,
when the speed of learning increases. Effect (2) now dominates over (3) everywhere.
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Let us now condition the probability of moving on the general human capi-
tal of the worker g (e.g. to study mobility of high human capital workers, keep-
ing in mind that they do not know that their general human capital is high).
I then obtain a probability of moving after the end of the first period equal to
Φ
(
1
2+r
1√
2pi
(σ2s+σ2g)
3
2
σ2s
√
σ2s+2σ
2
g
− g−mg
σs
)
. This probability is increasing in σ2g and varies am-
biguously with σ2s . Besides, it is obviously decreasing in g: workers with high human
capital will tend to attribute part of their good productivity in their first job to the
match-specific component of their productivity, thus over-estimating the quality of
their current match and under-estimating the returns to mobility. This prediction
does not seem to fit the data very well12. I believe that this can be solved by in-
troducing asymmetric information (which was not done in this paper, as signalling
considerations arise which complicate the tractability considerably). Assuming in-
deed that the worker is aware of his high human capital, while the firms are not,
could increase the incentives to move for high general human capital workers, whilst
reducing that of low general human capital workers.
4.2.2 Equilibrium wages
In this subsection, I allow for firms to make wage offers to the worker at the beginning
of each period. This contrasts with the previous version of the model, where wages
were assumed to equal expected total productivity instead of being set strategically
by firms. Firms now compete with each other to attract the worker. I will derive the
12Although it is hard to pick up and may call for a careful empirical study, there does not appear
to be an important effect of ability on mobility of workers in the data.
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equilibrium wage offers for the last two periods13.
I shall refer to the firm at which the worker is currently working as the current
firm, and to the firms at which he could be working after breaking the current match
as the other firms.
Third period
Between the second and third periods, the other firms will, in equilibrium, offer to
the worker a wage of µg2 (his expected productivity). If they offer more, they expect
to make losses, and if they offer less each of them would have an incentive to deviate
and offer slightly more, thus securing that if the worker moves, then he will move to
that firm.
The current firm will match that offer if and only if x2 > µ
g
2. In that case, I
assume that the worker will choose to stay with that firm (imagine that the firm
pays a very small  on top of µg2 to make sure the worker stays). Otherwise it will
offer x2
14.
Then the worker moves at the beginning of the third period if and only if x2 < µ
g
2.
Second period
Theorem 4.2.4 Between the first and second periods,
13In the first period, all firms make the same wage offer, the algebraic formulation of which too
complex to comment. For the curious reader, the said expression is
w = mg +
1
1 + r
[
(2 + r)
σ2s√
σ2s + σ2g
φ
(
1
2 + r
1√
2pi
σ2s + σ
2
g
σs
√
σ2s + 2σ2g
)
− 1√
2pi
σ2s
√
σ2s + σ2g√
σ2s + 2σ2g
(
1− Φ
(
1
2 + r
1√
2pi
σ2s + σ
2
g
σs
√
σ2s + 2σ2g
))]
14In fact this is only one out of a continuum of possible equilibria. If x2 < µ
g
2
, the current firm
offering any wage strictly below µg
2
is an equilibrium. Likewise, if x2 > µ
g
2
, all that is needed for
there to be an equilibrium is that at least one of the other firms offers µg
2
. The other firms are
indifferent between any wage offer below µg
2
.
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• If (x1−µg1) < 12+r 1√2pi
σ2s√
σ2s+S1
2
, then the worker moves. The current firm offers
x1
15. The other firms offer µg1 +
1
1+r
(
1√
2pi
σ2s√
σ2s+S1
2
)
.
• If (x1 − µg1) ≥ 12+r 1√2pi
σ2s√
σ2s+S1
2
then the worker stays. All firms offer16 µg1 +
1
1+r
(
1√
2pi
σ2s√
σ2s+S1
2
)
.
Proof Let us denote as Vc(x1) and Vo(x1), respectively, the wages offered in (an)
equilibrium by the current firm and the other firms. Then to ensure positive expected
profit of the current firm, we need Vc(x1) ≤ x1 + 11+r1x1≥µg1(x1 − µ
g
1). Likewise, we
need, for the other firms, Vo(x1) ≤ µg1+ 11+r 1√2pi
σ2s√
σ2s+S1
2
, and because of competition
between firms the inequality needs to be an equality for all firms in equilibrium17.
If the worker stays, he will receive Vc(x1) +
1
1+rµ
g
1. If he moves, he expects to
receive Vo(x1) +
1
1+rE1(µ
g
2) = µ
g
1 +
1
1+r
[
µ
g
1 +
(
1√
2pi
σ2s√
σ2s+S1
2
)]
. He will therefore
move if and only if Vc(x1) < µ
g
1 +
1
1+r
(
1√
2pi
σ2s√
σ2s+S1
2
)
.
Given this behaviour of the worker, the optimal wage for the current firm to set
is µg1+
1
1+r
(
1√
2pi
σ2s√
σ2s+S1
2
)
, but this wage will guarantee positive profits only if it is
lower than x1+
1
1+r1x1≥µg1(x1−µ
g
1), which is only possible if x1 > µ
g
1. Therefore the
condition for the worker to stay is indeed (x1 − µg1) ≥ 12+r 1√2pi
σ2s√
σ2s+S1
2

Efficiency
The analysis above indicates that the turnover decisions of the worker depend on the
same conditions in the case of firm setting their wages as on that of the wages being
set equal to the productivity. That is to say, the mobility of the worker is efficient
even in the case where firms set their wages.
15For example. Anything below the other firms’ offer would give another, equivalent equilibrium.
16Or at least the current firm and one other firm do. The other firms can make lower offers and
yet sustain the equilibrium, as long as at least one offers exactly that wage.
17At least when the offer of the current firm is lower, i.e. when the worker moves.
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Efficiency of turnover between the second and third periods is intuitive. The other
firms make offers equal to the worker’s expected productivity on the new match, and
the current firm only matches this offer if the worker’s total productivity on the
current job is higher than the outside offers: therefore the worker will move if and
only if moving increases his expected output in the third period.
Efficiency between the first and second periods can be explained as follows. Due
to competition between other firms, the wage paid to the worker if he leaves his
current job is equal to his expected productivity on the new job, plus the expected
potential rent that can be extracted in period 3. His current employer can only
match offers up to his productivity on the current job, plus the rent it will extract
in period 3. Therefore, the incentives faced by the worker are exactly the same as
before18.
Note that this result is sensitive to the assumption that the worker is risk neutral.
If we were to make instead the assumption that the worker is risk averse, then he
would tend to move less when he is paid his exact productivity at the end of each
period than if the (risk neutral) firms can pay him his expected productivity at the
beginning of each period. But then his turnover would still be efficient in the case
of wage-setting firms. It is in the case of the wage set equal to productivity that
turnover would be inefficiently low.
In environments of imperfect but symmetric information like this one, it is not
unusual to observe such efficient turnover behaviour when the firms set wages. In
Felli and Harris (1996) and Jovanovic (1979), it is indeed the case that the worker’s
turnover decisions maximize social surplus given the information available in the
economy. One paper that differs is Felli and Harris (2004). By introducing firm-
specific training as a choice variable of the firms, the authors introduce inefficiencies in
18There is only a difference in timing, with wages paid in period 2 anticipating productivity in
period 3.
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their model, which in all variations of their baseline model translate into inefficiently
low turnover.
Rent sharing, general and specific productivity
The worker invariably gets all of what is believed to be the return from his general
productivity. He also receives a positive bonus corresponding to the rent the firm
expects to be able to extract from match-specific productivity in subsequent periods.
This result is similar to those in Eeckhout (2006)19.
However, the particular realization of match-specific productivity is a risk sup-
ported entirely by the firm. It may take a high value that no other firm can expect
to enjoy, and that the current firm can enjoy for several periods; or a low value which
will lead to the immediate break of the match. As a consequence of competition,
firms expect to make zero profits.
Let us have a look at how the return from a high general productivity is shared
between the firms and the worker. By looking at the wage equations, it becomes clear
that high general productivity workers only get rent from their high ability through
the economy’s belief of it. That is, initially all workers are paid the same wage
(first period), after which high productivity workers, in general, will be believed to
be more able (in the sense of general productivity) and will get added returns from
it. The opposite is true for workers with low general productivity, who can thus
enjoy benefits from having their productivity over-estimated by the economy. The
latter effect is stronger when hs is low and hg is high (that is, when updating is
slow). However, since the workers do not have more information than the firms, they
cannot adapt their turnover behaviour to this. If they did have more information,
19However my assumptions differ in many dimensions. Eeckhout assumes that employers have
asymmetric information about the worker’s general human capital, with the current employer having
access to a better signal; moreover, the wage setting rule is a second price auction. Yet Eeckhout
finds, like me, that employers bid up to the expected (general) productivity, plus all rents that can
be extracted in the future.
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we might expect (ceteris paribus, i.e. for a given level of total productivity) high
productivity workers to move more to signal their type and get the rent from it, and
low productivity workers to move less to hide their type and continue enjoying a rent
they do not actually deserve20.
4.3 Infinite-period model
4.3.1 Model
In this section I present a more general version of the model, where agents live
and work for an infinite number of periods. Given the increased complexity of the
problem, it becomes impossible to derive closed form formulae for the wage and
the mobility decision; however numerical method can be applied, and I present the
results of simulations for a wide variety of parameter values.
The basic assumptions and notations of the model are unchanged. Similarly to
the three-period version, the worker is never going to move after not moving at least
once in the past. This is because while on a given match, no new information is
revealed, and the incentives that the worker faces are static. Hence we should expect
every individual to move every period for a certain time, and then stop moving
forever.
The present discounted value of future income can be represented by a time-
invariant Bellman function, which I denote as Π, that takes as its arguments x
(present production), µg (present belief on general human capital), and n (number
of past moves, indicative of the precision of the present belief on g). With these
notations, the present belief on g is g ∼ N(µg, hg + nhs).
20But this behaviour would, in turn, be informative to firms.
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We then have:
Π(x, µg, n) = x+ βMax
(
x
1− β ,Ex∗V
(
x∗,
µg(hg + nhs) + x
∗hs
(hg + (n+ 1)hs)
, (n+ 1)
))
where x∗ is believed to follow a normal N(µg, hths
ht+hs
).
I compute Π numerically for different values of hg, hs (reflecting the relative im-
portance of firm specific and general human capitals, as well as the speed of learning
about general human capital) and of β = 11+r (reflecting the rate at which the future
is discounted, which can also be interpreted as related to the life expectancy of the
individual). The computational method used is as follows.
(1) Expectations are computed using Monte Carlo integration, using Halton se-
quences for increased efficiency21. This requires taking the mean of the function of
which we wish to know the expected value, on a quasi-random sample designed in
such a way as to cover the space more evenly than a truly random sample would.
This results in greater accuracy, for a given computation time.
(2) Π is calculated recursively, iterating until convergence. The computational
burden increases exponentially with the number of iterations, as each iteration calls
the previous function as many times as the length of the Halton sequence used in
the integration (I typically used a length of 100). To avoid this problem, I substi-
tute Π with an approximation22 every two iterations until the function reaches the
neighbourhood of its limit; and then every three iterations for the last few iterations.
(3) Iterations continue until the differences between two consecutive iterations
become negligible.
Based on this approach, we can, for different values of the parameters, examine
the destinies of cohorts of workers. Of particular interest are the evolution of the
21See, for example, Train (2009).
22The approximation is made by computing a 3-dimensional, 20× 20× 20 grid of values for x, µg
and n; values between grid nodes are approximated by a weighted average of the nearest nodes.
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distribution of productivity and of beliefs about human capital over the lifetime, as
well as the patterns of mobility.
4.3.2 Wages in the infinite model
I assume for simplicity that the worker is paid a wage equal to his production each
period (ensuring efficient worker mobility). By contrast, allowing the firms to make
discretionary offers to the worker (as studied in the three-period model) would result
in wage offers that are a direct function of the current belief on g, independently of
his current match-specific human capital23.
More sophisticated contractual structures could be introduced (for example em-
ployment contracts that bind the firm and / or worker for several periods), but are
beyond the scope of this study and are left as a topic for further research.
Numerical simulations make an inquiry into wage dispersion possible. In par-
ticular, this model features residual wage dispersion, as per Burdett and Mortensen
(1998) and Postel-Vinay and Robin (2002): that is to say, workers that are initially
thought identical (same mg, hg, hs, hr) can have very different careers, depending
both on their (unobserved) general human capital g, and on the quality of the random
matches that they experience throughout their career.
4.3.3 Numerical analysis
I analyse numerically the effect of the different parameters of the model on outcomes.
The parameters under scrutiny are: (1) the precision of the initial belief on general
human capital hg; (2) the precision of the match-specific productivity hs; (3) the
precision of the random productivity shocks hr; and finally (4) the discount rate β.
The outcomes that I choose to examine are: (1) wage inequality, measured by
23This is because current match-specific productivity is irrelevant from the point of view of the
other firms, which define the outside option of the worker that the current firm has to match
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the ratio between the 9th and the 1st decile of the wage distribution; (2) mobility,
measured by the proportion of movers during a given period; (3) average productivity;
(4) average belief on general human capital; (5) standard deviation of belief on general
human capital; (6) number of past moves; (7) difference of number of past moves for
population with g above median, to that for population with g below median; (8)
the observed correlation between g and s in the matches that exist during any given
period.
For each set of parameters that I simulate, I randomly generate a cohort of 100,000
workers whose productivity and mobility decisions are as described by the model.
I simulate in this manner 36 (4 × 32) samples, one for each possible combination
of (hg, hs, β) where the domain for hg and hs is {.6, .8, 1} and the domain for β is
{.8, .85, .9, .95}. These domains allow for a wide range of relative signal precisions,
and a reasonably inclusive array of discount rates.
I examine the average effect of each parameter on each outcome over time, where
the effect of parameter p at period t on outcome y is defined as being the coefficient
on the parameter from a linear regression of outcome y on the four parameters for
the simulations taken at period t.
Results are reported for the twelve first periods only, as that is where most of the
learning and mobility take place given our parameter values.
Figure 4.1 shows how the outcomes respond to the parameters over time:
(a) Wage inequality is always fairly high; however it is decreasing over time.
This is because low ability (low g) workers are more likely to move than high ability
workers, and end up with a higher match-specific productivity than workers with
a high g. After a number of moves, this results in a situation where g and s are
negatively correlated (see (h)).
(b) The proportion of movers over time appears to be decreasing in most specifi-
cations; the speed of decrease is inversely related to the amount of employer learning
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Figure 4.1: Effect of the parameters over time
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to be expected in the labour market (i.e. high hs, low hg: each new match is very
informative about the quality of the match). The proportion of movers in any period
is also affected negatively by the discount factor β.
(c) Average productivity is globally increasing over time, though the increase is
much slower where s is precise (and g imprecise, to a lesser extent). Where s is
imprecise, many workers will benefit from an excellent draw (very productive job
match), and keep that match for many periods; by contrast, the effect of terrible
draws is exactly one period (and followed by another move).
(d) The average of the belief on general human capital is generally fairly close to
0. There are likely a number of effects at stake, the joint outcome of which is that
high presence of learning (low hg, high hs) results in slightly worse average belief
over general human capital.
(e) While the average belief is very close to zero, this conceals strong variability
across individuals, reflected in the standard deviation. The range of beliefs increases
somewhat over time, especially for low hg (i.e. where there is potential for learning).
(f) The average number of past moves is another perspective on the proportion
of movers per period, and the same patterns can be observed.
(g) It is found that in general, highly skilled workers (high g) move less, every
period, than low skilled workers. This is especially the case where g is imprecise and
s precise (meaning more difference between the average high skilled and the average
low skilled workers). That is because workers with high g attribute some of their
good luck on a probable high s (as they believe their g to be lower than it actually
is). Their incentive to move is therefore lower than workers with low g, who, by
contrast, will tend to blame their bad luck on a poor match.
(h) At any given period, s and g are found to be negatively correlated with each
other. This is driven by the mobility pattern found in (g). Workers with low g move
more and learn more about their human capital than workers with high g; therefore
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they become better able to recognize what is a good match for them and stick to it.
This is especially the case with high hg and low hs, i.e. where learning is slow, and
match-specific productivity has a high variance24.
4.3.4 Additive productivity shocks
Numerical approaches bring increased flexibility. It is straightforward, for example,
to introduce an additional source of uncertainty to the production of the worker. The
aim is to address two inaccuracies of the model as decribed so far: (1) wage dispersion
is predicted to decrease over time, which is at odds with empirical observations (see,
for example, Lemieux (2006)); and (2) workers are predicted to move every period
until they find a suitable employer, after which they never move anymore. While
worker mobility is indeed observed empirically to decrease over the life cycle, this
behaviour seems extreme.
In this section, an additive random walk is added to the productivity of the worker
on the job every period after the first period of any match. This will be shown to
solve both of those empirical inaccuracies.
The innovation of the random walk is denoted as rt, and assumed to be normally
distributed with mean 0 and precision hr. This does not affect information about
general human capital (and therefore, the outside wage offer), but does affect the
current employer’s reservation wage (and expected future wages at the current em-
ployer); therefore it also affects the mobility of the worker. A worker who experiences
a lasting negative shock on his present match may now wish to switch jobs, even if
the match had been satisfactory until now. This also implies that no match will last
forever, as, given enough time, the probability that a random walk goes below any
value can be observed to be arbitrarily close to one.
24This increases what can be thought of, somewhat loosely, as the “reservation (believed) match-
specific productivity”: indeed, a very good s becomes more common as hs decreases
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Results are reported in the same fashion as for the previous section, namely,
regression coefficients are reported for each of the twelve first time periods. hr is
made to vary over the same domain as hg and hs, i.e. (hg, hs, hr, β); this brings the
number of simulated samples from 36 (previous section) to 108 (36× 3).
Figure 4.2 shows how the outcomes respond to the parameters over time. Most
panels are not remarkably affected by the introduction of the random productivity
shocks; in particular the dynamics of learning about general capital are generally
unchanged. However, two key features are changed.
First, panel (a) now indicates increasing wage dispersion over the lifecycle; a lower
precision ha (i.e. larger productivity shocks) corresponds to larger wage dispersion
at all ages, and larger gradient of wage dispersion with respect to time period.
Second, workers now move more often, as indicated by panels (b) and (f); in
particular, the drop in the number of movers over time is much flatter than in the
previous section. Indeed, even after any arbitrary amount of time, the random shocks
will still cause a number of workers to switch jobs.
4.4 Discussion and conclusion
In this section, I critically assess the model described in this paper, and discuss
directions for further research.
On job mobility, I find declining rates of mobility with the life cycle, which is
a well documented stylized fact (see, for example, Topel and Ward (1992)). This
is mostly driven by the variations on job-specific productivity across jobs: workers
keep moving until they find a match that they think is good enough for them.
On rent sharing, I find that the belief that the economy has on a worker’s general
productivity has an important impact on how much rent its employer can extract. A
worker with high general productivity will only enjoy returns from it if all the firms
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are aware of this high productivity. This shows how much knowledge about general
human capital matters in wage determination, and suggests that workers would be
willing to strategically signal or hide their true general human capital if they had
private information about it.
It seems reasonable to expect that, in reality, workers have some idea of their
general human capital, through experiences that firms find hard to observe (e.g.
grades obtained in high school, amount of efforts needed to obtain a degree, etc.).
Asymmetric information such as this would likely affect some of the predictions of
the model. For example, it would likely no longer be the case that high general
productivity workers move less than less able workers. It may actually be the other
way round, if mobility can be used as a signal for high general human capital25. I
believe that introducing asymmetric information would make the worker’s turnover
decisions inefficient (relative to his knowledge), precisely because of these signalling
issues. High productivity worker’s mobility may be inefficiently high, and that of low
productivity workers inefficiently low.
Asymmetric information could also allow for endogenous education choices. For
example, it may be assumed that education is less costly for high general human
capital workers, who could therefore use it as another signalling device. The details
of this, of course, are for further research to determine. The current model will
provide a useful benchmark for future versions of this work, as it illustrates the
extreme situation where information is always perfectly symmetric.
Further research avenues include placing this framework in a wider context, for
example confronting it with data on careers (labour surveys, or longitudinal data).
25But this will probably only be possible if the worker’s information on his own general human
capital is perfect or very precise: otherwise, the signalling effect will compete with the effect of the
worker’s uncertainty. The former pushes mobility up (the worker wants to signal that his general
human capital is likely to be higher than the firms think), but the latter pushes it down (if the
worker observes a high productivity, he will be tempted to interpret it partly as job-specific, and
thus be reluctant to move).
CHAPTER 4. EMPLOYER LEARNING 102
Additional adjustments may have to be made to allow for (1) differences in education
(wich likely maps to the initial belief on general human capital, characterized by
mg and σg), and (2) on-the-job learning, which I excluded from this model. One
simple way to incorporate on-the-job learning without complicating the informational
structure would be to assume that every period spent on a match increases the
productivity of the match by a constant value.
This model illustrates the need for theories of employer learning that takes into
account the dual nature of uncertainty on the worker’s productivity. Models that
concentrate only on learning on general productivity often fail to feature realistic
job mobility and residual wage dispersion; and models that concentrate on learning
on match-specific productivity cannot feature signalling on worker general ability.
Either way, these models can only offer a very narrow understanding of labour market
dynamics.
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Appendix to chapter 2
Canon Law of 198326: Canons 375 to 380 relative to the
appointment of bishops
Canon 375
1 By divine institution, Bishops succeed the Apostles through the Holy Spirit who
is given to them. They are constituted Pastors in the Church, to be the teachers of
doctrine, the priests of sacred worship and the ministers of governance.
2 By their episcopal consecration, Bishops receive, together with the office of sanc-
tifying, the offices also of teaching and of ruling, which however, by their nature, can
be exercised only in hierarchical communion with the head of the College and its
members.
Canon 376
Bishops to whom the care of a given diocese is entrusted are called diocesan Bishops;
the others are called titular Bishops.
26The previous code of Canon Law goes back to 1917; but the rules outlined here have been
applied de facto throughout the period covered by my sample.
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Canon 377
1 The Supreme Pontiff freely appoints Bishops or confirms those lawfully elected.
2 At least every three years, the Bishops of an ecclesiastical province or, if circum-
stances suggest it, of an Episcopal Conference, are to draw up, by common accord
and in secret, a list of priests, even of members of institutes of consecrated life, who
are suitable for the episcopate; they are to send this list to the Apostolic See. This
is without prejudice to the right of every Bishop individually to make known to the
Apostolic See the names of priests whom he thinks are worthy and suitable for the
episcopal office.
3 Unless it has been lawfully prescribed otherwise, for the appointment of a diocesan
Bishop or a coadjutor Bishop, a ternus, as it is called, is to be proposed to the
Apostolic See. In the preparation of this list, it is the responsibility of the papal
Legate to seek individually the suggestions of the Metropolitan and of the Suffragans
of the province to which the diocese in question belongs or with which it is joined in
some grouping, as well as the suggestions of the president of the Episcopal Conference.
The papal Legate is, moreover, to hear the views of some members of the college of
consultors and of the cathedral chapter. If he judges it expedient, he is also to seek
individually, and in secret, the opinions of other clerics, both secular and religious,
and of lay persons of outstanding wisdom. He is then to send these suggestions,
together with his own opinion, to the Apostolic See.
4 Unless it has been lawfully provided otherwise, the diocesan Bishop who judges
that his diocese requires an auxiliary Bishop, is to propose to the Apostolic See a list
of the names of at least three priests suitable for this office.
110
5 For the future, no rights or privileges of election, appointment, presentation or
designation of Bishops are conceded to civil authorities.
Canon 378
1 To be a suitable candidate for the episcopate, a person must:
• be outstanding in strong faith, good morals, piety, zeal for souls, wisdom,
prudence and human virtues, and possess those other gifts which equip him to
fulfil the office in question;
• be held in good esteem;
• be at least 35 years old;
• be a priest ordained for at least five years;
• hold a doctorate or at least a licentiate in sacred Scripture, theology or canon
law, from an institute of higher studies approved by the Apostolic See, or at
least be well versed in these disciplines.
2 The definitive judgement on the suitability of the person to be promoted rests
with the Apostolic See.
Canon 379
Unless prevented by a lawful reason, one who is promoted to the episcopate must
receive episcopal consecration within three months of receiving the apostolic letters,
and in fact before he takes possession of his office.
Canon 380
Before taking canonical possession of his office, he who has been promoted is to make
the profession of faith and take the oath of fidelity to the Apostolic See, in accordance
111
with the formula approved by the same Apostolic See.
Appendix to chapter 3
The data
We use data from the French LFS (Enquête Emploi), years 1982 to 2010. Over this
period, the survey methodology underwent one major change, as well as a number of
smaller changes. We made every effort to ensure continuity in the variables that we
require for our estimations; this was made easier by the fact that, as a consequence of
the very nature of our methodology, only a very limited number of variables entered
our model.
Enquête Emploi en continu
The major break in the survey methodology occurred in 2002, when the LFS tran-
sitioned from a yearly schedule to a continuous process, where households can be
surveyed at any point during the year.
Up to 2002, the design was to survey every sampled household three times, in
March of three consecutive years. One third of the sample gets renewed every year.
From 2002 onwards, every sampled household was surveyed once every quarter,
for six consecutive quarters. One sixth of the sample gets renewed every quarter.
While this was accompanied by a change in the definition of some variables, most
of the variables of interest in this study (e.g. levels of education for the children) have
kept the same definition over the transition. Therefore, the only difficulty originating
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from this change was in terms of sampling.
When the data was collected annually, every household was surveyed in March,
meaning that a question such as FORM: “What level of education are you currently
enrolled in” was unambiguous. However, as households, in recent years, were also
asked the same question in other months, ambiguity arose. For example, there is no
official guideline to decide what a respondant should answer to this question during
summer holiday, between two grades.
To resolve this ambiguity, our strategy to build our sample of 16-years-olds was
the following:
• In the annual surveys (pre-2002), sample one child from all the household where
one sixteen year old is observed at least one year.
• In the continuous surveys (post-2002), only keep surveys from quarters one and
two (January to June), and sample one child from all the households where one
sixteen year old is observed is observed at least one (remaining) quarter.
Age and calendar year
In all the surveys, the age metric that we use is directly derived from the year of
birth, rather than the age at the time of the survey. More precisely, we use the age
as defined by the number of full years that will have elapsed by the end of the survey
year (31st of September). Hence, someone born on February 1982 will qualify as 16
years old when they are surveyed in March 1998.
This definition coincides with the modalities of compulsory schooling in France,
as children are required to start primary school in September of the calendar year in
which they reach age 6 – which means that, if no grade repetition occurs, they will
be admitted to seconde in the year in which they reach age 15. In March of the year
in which they reach age 16, they must therefore be in seconde.
